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A particularly important sector for the stability of ﬁnancial systems is
the banking sector. Banks play a central role in the money creation process
and in the payment system. Moreover, bank credit is an important factor
in the ﬁnancing of investment and growth. Faltering banking systems have
been associated with hyperinﬂations and depressions in economic history.
Hence, to preserve monetary and ﬁnancial stability central banks and su-
pervisory authorities have a special interest in assessing banking system
stability.
This is a particularly complex task in very large economies with highly
developed ﬁnancial systems, such as the United States and the euro area.
Moreover, structural changes in the ﬁnancial systems of both these econ-
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Eurosystem.gradually integrating ﬁnancial systems under a common currency increase
the relationships between banks across borders. This development raises
the question of how banking systems should be monitored in a context
where banking supervision—in contrast to monetary policy—remains a
national responsibility. In the United States, tremendous consolidation as
well as the removal of regulatory barriers to universal and cross-state bank-
ing has led to the emergence of large and complex banking organizations
(LCBOs), whose activities and interconnections are particularly diﬃcult 
to follow. For all these reasons we present a new approach in this paper of
how to assess banking system risk, and apply it to the euro area and the
United States.
A complication in assessing banking system stability is that, in contrast
to other elements of the ﬁnancial system, such as securities values, inter-
bank relationships that can be at the origin of bank contagion phenomena
or the values of and correlations between loan portfolios are particularly
hard to measure and monitor.1 Hence, a large part of the published bank-
ing stability literature has resorted to more indirect market indicators. In
particular, spillovers in bank equity prices have been used for this purpose.
Pioneered by Aharony and Swary (1983), a series of papers has examined
the eﬀects of speciﬁc bank failures or bad news for certain banks on other
banks’ stock prices (see also Wall and Petersen 1990, or Docking, Hirschey,
and Jones 1997).2In another series of papers various regression approaches
are used in order to link abnormal bank stock returns to asset-side risks
(e.g., Smirlock and Kaufold 1987, Musumeci and Sinkey 1990). In fact, 
some authors point out that most banking crises have been related to macro-
economic ﬂuctuations rather than to prevalent contagion (e.g., Gorton
1988, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 1998).3
An issue in the previously noted literature is that any form of stock mar-
ket reaction is considered. The extreme-value approach for assessing bank-
ing system risk advocated in this paper also employs equity prices, but fo-
cuses only on crisis propagations, that is, relationships between extremely
large negative returns. We want to make three main contributions com-
pared to the previous literature. First, we use the novel multivariate ex-
treme value techniques applied by Hartmann, Straetmans, and de Vries
(2003a, 2003b, and 2004) and Poon, Rockinger, and Tawn (2004) to esti-
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1. Even central banks and supervisory authorities usually do not have continuous infor-
mation about interbank exposures. For the Swedish example of a central bank monitoring in-
terbank exposures at a quarterly frequency, see Blavarg and Nimander (2002).
2. Chen (1999), Allen and Gale (2000), and Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2002) develop the
theoretical foundations of bank contagion.
3. Hellwig (1994) argues that the observed vulnerability of banks to macroeconomic shocks
may be explained by the fact that deposit contracts are not conditional on aggregate risk.
For a comprehensive survey of the theoretical and empirical contagion and systemic risk
literature, see De Bandt and Hartmann (2000). We list the most recent contributions in the
accompanying working paper (Hartmann, Straetmans, and de Vries 2005).mate the strength of banking system risks. In particular, we distinguish
conditional co-crash probabilities between banks from crash probabilities
conditional on aggregate shocks. While extreme value theory (EVT)—
both univariate and multivariate—has been applied to general stock in-
dices before, it has not yet been used to assess the extreme dependence be-
tween bank stock returns with the aim to measure banking system risk.
Second, we cover both euro area countries and the United States to com-
pare banking system stability internationally. We are not aware of any
other study that tries to compare systemic risk in these major economies.
Third, we apply the test of structural stability for tail indexes by Quintos,
Fan, and Phillips (2001) to the multivariate case of extreme linkages and as-
sess changes in banking system stability over time with it. Again, whereas
a few earlier papers addressed the changing correlations between bank
stock returns (e.g., de Nicoló and Kwast 2002), none focused on the ex-
treme interdependence we are interested in in the present paper.
The idea behind our approach is as follows. We assume that bank stocks
are eﬃciently priced, in that they reﬂect all publicly available information
about (1) individual banks’ asset and liability side risks and (2) relation-
ships between diﬀerent banks’ risks (be it through correlations of their loan
portfolios, interbank lending, or other channels). We identify the risk of a
problem in one or several banks spilling over to other banks (contagion
risk) with extreme negative comovements between individual bank stocks
(similar to the conditional co-crash probability in our earlier stock, bond,
and currency papers). In addition, we identify the risk of banking system
destabilization through aggregate shocks with the help of the “tail- ” pro-
posed by Straetmans, Verschoor, and Wolf (2003). The tail-  is measured
by conditioning our co-crash probability on a general stock index (or an-
other measure of systematic risk) rather than on individual banks’ stock
prices. Therefore, in some respects it reﬂects the tail equivalent to standard
asset pricing models. In this paper we further extend the analysis of tail- 
by also using high-yield bond spreads as measures of aggregate risk. Based
on the estimated individual co-crash probabilities and tail- s, we can then
test for the equality of banking system risk between the United States and
the euro area and for changes in systemic risk over time.
Our work is also related to the broader literature examining which phe-
nomena constitute ﬁnancial contagion and how they can be empirically
identiﬁed. In our reading, the main criteria proposed so far to identify con-
tagion are that (1) a problem at a ﬁnancial institution adversely aﬀects
other ﬁnancial institutions or that a decline in an asset price leads to de-
clines in other asset prices (e.g., Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz 2003); (2) the rela-
tionships between failures or asset price declines must be diﬀerent from
those observed in normal times (regular interdependence; see Forbes and
Rigobon 2002); (3) the relationships are in excess of what can be explained
by economic fundamentals (Pindyck and Rotemberg 1993, and Bekaert,
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ative extremes, such as full-blown institution failures or market crashes, 
so that they correspond to crisis situations (Longin and Solnik 2001, 
and Hartmann et al. 2004); (5) the relationships are the result of propa-
gations over time rather than being caused by the simultaneous eﬀects 
of common shocks. Most empirical approaches proposed in the recent
literature on how to measure contagion capture the ﬁrst criterion (1), but
this is where the agreement usually ends. Authors diﬀer in their views of
which of the other criteria (2) through (5) are essential for contagion. The
reason why we particularly focus on criterion (4) is that it allows us to con-
centrate on events that are severe enough to always be of a concern for pol-
icy. Other criteria are also interesting and have their own justiﬁcations, but
more regular propagations or changes in them are not necessarily a con-
cern for policies that aim at the stability of ﬁnancial systems.
The data we use in this work are daily bank stock excess returns in euro-
area countries and the United States between April 1992 and February
2004. For each area or country we chose twenty-ﬁve banks based on the
criteria of balance-sheet size and involvement in interbank lending. So, our
sample represents the most systemically relevant ﬁnancial institutions, but
neglects a large number of smaller banks. During our sample period sev-
eral of the banks selected faced failure-like situations; also, global markets
passed through several episodes of stress. All in all, we have about 3,100
observations per bank.
Our results suggest that the risk of multivariate extreme spillovers be-
tween U.S. banks is higher than between European banks. Hence, despite
the fact that available balance-sheet data show higher interbank exposures
in the euro area, the U.S. banking system seems to be more prone to con-
tagion risk. The lower spillover risk among European banks is mainly re-
lated to relatively weak cross-border linkages among a certain number of
countries. Domestic linkages in France, Germany, and Italy, for example,
are of the same order as domestic U.S. linkages. One interpretation of this
result is that further banking integration in Europe could lead to higher
cross-border contagion risk in the future, with the more integrated U.S.
banking system providing a benchmark. Second, cross-border spillover
probabilities tend to be smaller than domestic spillover probabilities, but
only for a few countries is this diﬀerence statistically signiﬁcant. For ex-
ample, among the banks from a number of larger countries—such as
France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain—extreme cross-border link-
ages are statistically indistinguishable from domestic linkages. In con-
trast, the eﬀects of banks from these larger countries on the main banks
from some smaller countries—including Finland and Greece in particular,
and sometimes Ireland or Portugal—tend to be signiﬁcantly weaker than
the eﬀects on their domestic banks. Hence, those smaller countries located
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ropean cross-border contagion.
Third, the eﬀects of macro shocks emphasized by the estimated tail- s
are similar for the euro area and the United States, and they illustrate the
relevance of aggregate risks for banking system stability. While stock mar-
ket indices perform well as indicators of aggregate risk, we ﬁnd that high-
yield bond spreads capture extreme systematic risk for banks relatively
poorly, both in Europe and the United States. Fourth, structural stability
tests for our indicators suggest that systemic risk, both in the form of in-
terbank spillovers and in the form of aggregate risk, has increased in Eu-
rope and in the United States. Our tests detect the break points during the
second half of the 1990s, but graphic illustrations of our extreme depend-
ence measures show that this was the result of developments spread out
over time. In particular in Europe the process was very gradual, in line with
what one would expect during a slowly advancing ﬁnancial integration
process. Interestingly, the introduction of the euro in January 1999 seems
to have had a reductionary or no eﬀect on banking system risk in the euro
area. This may be explained by the possibility that stronger cross-border
crisis transmission channels through a common money market could be
oﬀset by better risk sharing and the better ability of a deeper market to ab-
sorb shocks.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section describes our two
theoretical indicators of banking system stability. Section 4.3 brieﬂy out-
lines the estimation procedures for both measures; section 4.4 sketches the
tests for their stability over time and across countries and continents. Sec-
tion 4.5 describes the data we employ. Section 4.6 then presents the empir-
ical results on extreme bank spillover risks; section 4.7 turns to the empir-
ical results for aggregate banking system risk (tail- s). Section 4.8 asks the
question whether systemic risk has changed over time. The ﬁnal section
concludes. We have ﬁve appendices. Appendix A describes in greater depth
our estimation procedures and appendix B the structural stability test. Ap-
pendix C discusses small sample properties of estimators and tests. Appen-
dix D lists the banks in our sample and the abbreviations used for them in
the paper. Finally, appendix E discusses the relevance of volatility modeling
for ﬁnancial stability policy-oriented research and examines the impor-
tance of volatility clustering for extreme dependence in bank stock returns.
4.2 Indicators of Banking System Stability
Our indicators of banking system stability are based on extreme stock
price movements. They are constructed as conditional probabilities, con-
ditioning single or multiple bank stock price crashes on other banks’ stock
price crashes or on crashes of the market portfolio. Extreme comovements,
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banks’ stock returns, are meant to capture the risk of contagion from one
bank to another. Extreme comovements between individual banks’ stock
returns and the returns of a general stock market index or another measure
of nondiversiﬁable risk (the so-called “tail- ”) are used to assess the risk 
of banking system instability through aggregate shocks. The two forms of
banking system instability are theoretically distinct, but in practice they
may sometimes interact. Both have been extensively referred to in the the-
oretical and empirical banking literature.
4.2.1 Multivariate Extreme Spillovers: 
A Measure of Bank Contagion Risk
Let us start by describing the measure of multivariate extreme bank
spillovers. The measure can be expressed in terms of marginal (univariate)
and joint (multivariate) exceedance probabilities. Consider an N-
dimensional banking system, that is, a set of N banks from, for example,
the same country or continent. Denote the log ﬁrst diﬀerences of the price
changes in bank stocks minus the risk-free interest rate by the random var-
iables Xi(i   1 ,  ...,  N). Thus, Xi describes a bank i’s excess return. We
adopt the convention to take the negative of stock returns, so that we can
deﬁne all used formulae in terms of upper tail returns. The crisis levels or
extreme quantiles Qi(i   1 ,  ...,  N) are chosen such that the tail probabil-
ities are equalized across banks; that is,
P(X1   Q1)   ...     P(Xi   Qi)   ...     P(XN   QN)   p.
With the probability level in common, crisis levels Qi will generally not
be equal across banks, because the marginal distribution functions P(Xi  
Qi)   1 – F i(Qi) are bank speciﬁc. The crisis levels can be interpreted as
“barriers” that will on average only be broken once in 1/ptime periods, that
is, p–1 days if the data frequency is daily. Suppose now that we want to mea-
sure the propagation of severe problems throughout the European and
U.S. banking sectors by calculating the probability of joint collapse in an
arbitrarily large set of N bank stocks, conditional on the collapse of a sub-
set L   N banks:
(1) P N|L  P  
N
i 1
Xi   Qi( p)   
L
j 1
Xj   Qj(p) 
  .
Clearly, the right-hand side immediately follows from the deﬁnition of con-
ditional probability. With independence the measure reduces to pN–L. This
provides a benchmark against which the dependent cases are to be judged.
Equation (1) is very ﬂexible in terms of the conditioning set on the right-
P[ N
i 1 Xi   Qi(p)]
   
P[ L
j 1 Xj   Qj(p)]
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be a subset of the bank set on the left-hand side. Moreover, the condition-
ing random variables could also be other than just bank stock prices.4
4.2.2 Tail- s: A Measure of Aggregate Banking System Risk
Our second measure of banking system risk is from a methodological
point of view a bivariate variant of equation (1), in which N   1 and the
conditioning set is limited to extreme downturns of the market portfolio or
another indicator of aggregate risk (L 1).5This tail- measure is inspired
by portfolio theory and has been used before by Straetmans, Verschoor,
and Wolﬀ (2003) to examine the intraday eﬀects of the September 11 ca-
tastrophe on U.S. stocks. Let XM be the excess return on the market port-
folio (e.g., using a stock market index) and let p be the common tail prob-
ability; then this measure can be written as:
(2) P[Xk   Qk(p)⏐XM   QM(p)]  
  .
The measure captures how likely it is that an individual bank’s (k) value de-
clines dramatically if there is an extreme negative systematic shock. Anal-
ogous to the multivariate spillover probability (1), the tail-  (2) reduces to
p2/p   p under the benchmark of independence. We extend the analysis of
extreme aggregate risk in this paper by also experimenting with high-yield
bond spreads as a measure XM of systematic shocks.6
4.3 Estimation of the Indicators
The joint probabilities in (1) and (2) have to be estimated. Within the
framework of a parametric probability law, the calculation of the proposed
multivariate probability measures is straightforward, because one can esti-
mate the distributional parameters by (for example) maximum likelihood
techniques. However, if one makes the wrong distributional assumptions,
the linkage estimates may be severely biased due to misspeciﬁcation. As
there is no clear evidence that all stock returns follow the same distribu-
tion—even less so for the crisis situations we are interested in here—we
P[Xk   Qk(p), XM   QM(p)]
   
p
P[Xk   Qk(p), XM   QM(p)]
    
P[XM   QM(p)]
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4. In Hartmann, Straetmans, and de Vries (2003a), we applied an analogous measure to as-
sess the systemic breadth of currency crises.
5. Technically, it is also possible to derive and estimate this measure for N   1, but we do
not do this in the present paper.
6. In the present paper we limit ourselves to the measures (1) and (2) of banking system risk.
In future research, the approach could be extended by also including further economic vari-
ables in the conditioning set, such as interest rates or exchange rates.want to avoid very speciﬁc assumptions for bank stock returns. Therefore,
we implement the semiparametric EVT approach proposed by Ledford and
Tawn (1996; see also Draisma et al. 2001, and Poon, Rockinger, and Tawn
2004, for recent applications). Loosely speaking, their approach consists of
generalizing some “best practice” in univariate extreme value analysis.
After a transformation of the return data to unit Pareto marginals,
which removes any inﬂuence of the marginal distributions on the proba-
bilities of interest, we can rewrite the joint tail probability that occurs in








i   q .
X ˜
i is the excess return of Xi after the transformation, and q   1/p. We
describe the details of this step in appendix A. The consequence is that
diﬀerences in joint tail probabilities across diﬀerent banking systems (e.g.,
United States versus Europe) can now be attributed solely to diﬀerences in
the tail-dependence structure of the extremes.
The multivariate estimation problem is thus reduced to estimating a uni-
variate exceedance probability for the cross-sectional minimum of the N
bank excess return series; that is, it is always true that








i)   q]   P[X ˜
min   q].
The estimation exploits the fact that under fairly general conditions the
auxiliary variable X ˜
min has a regularly varying tail (Ledford and Tawn
1996).7 Assuming that the tail index of X ˜
min is   1/ , the univariate prob-
ability in equation (3) exhibits a tail descent of the Pareto type:
(4) P(X ˜
min   q) ≈ q–1/ ,   1,
with q large (p small). The higher   the more dependent are the compo-
nents (X ˜
1,  ...,  X ˜
i,  ...,  X ˜
N) from (3) far out in their joint tail. As we argue
in appendix A, if the return series X ˜
i are asymptotically dependent then 
  1, and if they are asymptotically independent then   1.
We estimate equation (4) with the semiparametric probability estimator
from de Haan et al. (1994):
(5) P ˆ(X ˜
min   q)     
1  
,
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7. A function F(x) is said to have a regularly varying left tail if
lim
u→ 
F( ux)/F( u)   x  
for any x   0 and tail index   0.where n is the sample size and the “tail cut-oﬀ point” Cn–m,n is basically the
(n – m)-th largest return from the cross-sectional minimum series X ˜
min.
Equation (5) extends the empirical distribution function of X ˜
min for more
extreme returns q than the ones observed in the sample. It is conditional
upon the tail dependence parameter   and a choice of the threshold pa-
rameter m.
To estimate   we use the popular Hill (1975) estimator for the index of
regular variation:
(6)   ˆ   ∑
m 1
j 0
ln     .
m is the number of most extreme returns that enter the estimation. Appen-
dix A contains a discussion on how it is chosen optimally. Draisma et al.
(2001) derive asymptotic normality of  m  (  ˆ/  – 1) under fairly general
conditions. The asymptotic normality will prove convenient for the tests
implemented later on. We discuss small-sample properties of our tail-
dependence estimator   ˆ in the ﬁrst section of appendix C.
4.4 Hypothesis Testing
In this section we introduce some tests that can be used to assess various
hypotheses regarding the evolution and structure of systemic risk in the
banking system. The ﬁrst one allows to test for the structural stability of
the amount of risk found with our two indicators. In the ﬁrst subsection we
present the rationale for using this test and the intuition of how it works.
Appendix B contains a more detailed technical exposition. The second test
in subsection 4.4.2 allows us to compare systemic risk across countries and
continents.
4.4.1 Time Variation
The multivariate linkage estimator (1) and its bivariate counterpart in
(2) were presented so far as assuming stationarity of tail behavior over
time. From a policy perspective, however, it is important to know whether
systemic risk in the banking system—either in terms of contagion risk (1)
or in terms of extreme systematic risk (2)—has changed over time. As the
discussion of the Ledford and Tawn approach toward estimating (1) or (2)
has shown, the structural (in)stability of systemic risk will critically depend
on whether the tail dependence parameter   is constant or not. We study
the occurrence of upward and downward swings in   with a recently de-
veloped structural stability test for the Hill statistic (6).
Quintos, Fan, and Phillips (2001) present a number of tests for identify-
ing single unknown breaks in the estimated tail index   ˆ . As our estimation









Banking System Stability 141univariate estimation problem, we can choose from them the best test pro-
cedures for our tail dependence parameter  . Balancing the prevention of
type I and type II errors, we opt for their recursive test.
This test takes a window of the data at the start of the sample and esti-
mates the respective   ˆ. It then reestimates the tail dependence parameter,
successively increasing the data window until the end of the sample is
reached. One calculates the (appropriately scaled) ratios of the subsample
 s and the full sample equivalent and chooses the date with the maximum
ratio as a candidate break point. The null hypothesis of the test is that there
is no change in   over time. The alternative hypothesis is that asymptotic
dependence has either increased or decreased at some point in time.
Asymptotic critical values of the suprema of the ratio series have been
derived by Quintos, Fan, and Phillips (2001). They are 1.46, 1.78, and 2.54
for the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent signiﬁcance levels, respectively.
If the data exhibit nonlinear intertemporal dependencies, such as the 
well-known autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) eﬀects
(volatility clustering) in ﬁnancial returns, then some additional scaling of
the test statistic is needed to avoid erroneous inference. In contrast to
Quintos, Fan, and Phillips, we estimate the asymptotic variance of the de-
pendence parameter that is used for the scaling with a block bootstrap,
which accounts for more general dependencies than ARCH. If the supre-
mum of the scaled ratio exceeds the critical values, the test rejects the null
hypothesis of constant extreme dependence.
Quintos, Fan, and Phillips report a Monte Carlo study that indicates
good small sample power, size, and bias properties of the recursive break
test. Only in the case of a decrease of extreme tail dependence under the al-
ternative hypothesis ( 1    2) do they detect less-acceptable power prop-
erties. We solve this problem by executing the recursive test both in a “for-
ward” version and a “backward” version. The forward version calculates
the subsample  s in calendar time, and the backward version in reverse cal-
endar time. If a downward break in   occurs and the forward test does not
pick it up, then the backward test corrects for this. The second section of
appendix C provides a further Monte Carlo study of the small-sample
properties of the recursive structural break test.
4.4.2 Cross-sectional Variation
We would also like to know whether cross-sectional diﬀerences between
various groups of banks or diﬀerent banking systems, say between the
United States and Europe or between diﬀerent European countries, are
statistically and economically signiﬁcant. The asymptotic normality of   ˆ
referred to earlier enables some straightforward hypothesis testing. A test
for the equality of tail-dependence parameters (null hypothesis) is based
on the following T-statistic:
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which converges to a standard normal distribution in large samples.8 Ac-
cordingly, the asymptotic critical values are 1.65, 1.96, and 2.58 for the 10
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent signiﬁcance levels, respectively. In the fol-
lowing empirical applications, the asymptotic standard error in the test’s
denominator (7) is estimated using a block bootstrap.9 Similar to the pre-
vious structural stability test, we opt for bootstrapping in blocks because
of the nonlinear dependencies that might be present in the return data.
4.5 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We collected daily stock price data (total return indexes including divi-
dends) for twenty-ﬁve euro area banks and twenty-ﬁve U.S. banks. Excess
returns are constructed by taking log ﬁrst diﬀerences and deducting three-
month London Interbank Oﬀered Rate (LIBOR) rates (adjusted linearly
to derive daily from annual rates). They are expressed in local currency so
that they do not vary directly with exchange rates. The market risk factor
or aggregate shocks to the euro area and U.S. banking systems are proxied
by several measures, with an eye toward some sensitivity analysis. First, we
employ a general stock index and the banking sector subindex for the euro
area and the United States, respectively. Second, we use the spread between
below-investment-grade and treasury bond yields for each of these econ-
omies. Finally, we use a global stock index and the global banking sector
subindex.
All series, except one, start on 2 April, 1992, and end on 27 February,
2004, rendering 3,106 return observations per bank. The euro area high-
yield bond spread is only available from 1 January, 1998, onward, yielding
1,497 observations. All series are downloaded from Datastream, whose
source for high-yield bond spreads is Merrill Lynch.10The stock indices are
the total return indexes calculated by the data provider.
The following subsection provides information about how the ﬁfty
banks were chosen, based on balance sheet items for European and U.S.
banks. The subsequent section discusses the return data, in particular their
negative extremes.
  ˆ 1    ˆ 2   
s.e.(  ˆ 1    ˆ 2)
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8. One can safely assume that T comes suﬃciently close to normality for empirical sample
sizes as the one used in this paper (see, e.g., Hall 1982, or Embrechts, Klüppelberg, and
Mikosch 1997).
9. As for the test of time variation (see appendix B), we follow Hall, Horowitz, and Jing
(1995) and set the optimal block length equal to n1/3.
10. See de Bondt and Marques (2004) for an in-depth discussion of high-yield bond
spreads.4.5.1 Bank Selection and Balance Sheet Information
The time dimension of this dataset was very much constrained by the un-
availability of longer stock price series for European banks. Before the
1990s fewer large European banks were privately quoted on stock ex-
changes; also, many banks disappeared as a consequence of mergers.11
Roughly in proportion to the sizes of their economies in terms of gross do-
mestic product (GDP) and the sizes of their banking systems in terms of
assets, we have six banks from Germany, four banks from France, four
banks from Italy, three banks from Spain, two banks each from the Nether-
lands and from Belgium, and one bank from Finland, Greece, Ireland, and
Portugal, respectively. Appendix D contains the full list of banks, the ab-
breviations used in the tables, and their country of origin.
Apart from those constraints, banks were chosen on the basis of two
main criteria: ﬁrst, their size (as measured mainly by assets and deposits)
and, second, their involvement in interbank lending (as measured by inter-
bank loans, amounts due to and due from other banks, and total money
market funding). The necessary balance-sheet information was taken from
Bureau van Dijk’s Bankscope database (considering end-of-year values
between 1992 and 2003). For the United States, the choice of banks was
double-checked on the basis of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago com-
mercial bank and bank holding company databases.
We used this balance-sheet information to identify the “systemically
most important” banks across all the twelve years. By using several crite-
ria, some choices naturally had to be made. We showed the data and dis-
cussed the choices in detail in the accompanying working paper (see sub-
section 4.5.1 and appendix C in Hartmann, Straetmans, and C. de Vries
2005). Here we just list two interesting observations from this: (1) while in
Europe bank size and interbank lending activity are quite aligned, in the
United States a number of smaller banks (such as State Street, Northern
Trust, Bank of New York, or Mellon) have very large interbank exposures.
We are careful to have these clearing banks in our sample of twenty-ﬁve
U.S. banks, as the failure of one or several of them may constitute a partic-
ularly severe source of contagion risk,12 and (2) the sizes of euro area and
U.S. banks chosen are similar, but the data also show much larger inter-
bank exposures among European than among U.S. banks. To our knowl-
edge, this diﬀerence has not been noted in the literature on banking system
144 Philipp Hartmann, Stefan Straetmans, and Casper G. de Vries
11. Ten out of twelve euro area countries have banks in our sample. There is no Austrian
bank, as we could not construct a long enough stock price series for any of the two largest
banks from this country. We deliberately excluded banks from Luxembourg, as they are con-
siderably smaller than the larger banks from all other euro area countries.
12. For example, the failure of Continental Illinois in 1983–84 and the computer problem
of Bank of New York in 1985 raised major concerns and were accompanied by public action
in order to prevent those incidents from spreading through the banking system.risk before. It will be interesting to subsequently verify whether it translates
into larger systemic risk in the European banking system.
4.5.2 Stock Returns and Yield Spreads
The accompanying working paper presents an extensive discussion of
the typical host of descriptive statistics for our ﬁfty bank stock return se-
ries and the factors capturing aggregate risk (see subsection 4.5.2 and
appendix D in Hartmann, Straetmans, and C. de Vries 2005). As the results
are pretty standard, we list here only two observations: (1) while individual
bank stock returns are highly correlated with stock indices, the same does
not apply to high-yield bond spreads. This provides ﬁrst evidence that yield
spreads might not be a good predictor of aggregate banking system risk,
and (2) correlations between individual bank stock returns are generally
positive and of similar order of magnitude in the euro area and in the
United States. For the United States, however, correlation coeﬃcients ap-
pear to be much more uniform across bank pairs.
For the purpose of the present paper, we are particularly interested in ex-
treme negative returns. The left-hand sides of tables 4.1 and 4.2 report the
three largest negative excess returns (in absolute value) for all the banks in
the sample and for the two banking sector stock indices. Starting with Eu-
rope, the largest stock price decline in the sample (a massive daily collapse
of 85 percent) happens for Banco Espanol de Credito (Banesto) in Febru-
ary 1994. Around that time, this Spanish bank faced major diﬃculties and
was rescued by an initial public intervention in December 1993. Another
bank in major diﬃculties during our sample period is Berliner Bankge-
sellschaft from Germany. This is reﬂected in two consecutive stock price
crashes of 38 percent and 27 percent during the summer of 2001. Ulti-
mately this bank was also saved by the federal state of Berlin. As regards
the United States, the largest daily stock price slump happens to Union-
bancal Corporation. The market value of this troubled California bank de-
clined in June 2000 by as much as 36 percent, as a consequence of credit
quality problems. The next most signiﬁcant corrections of just above 20
percent occur for Comerica Inc. and AmSouth Bancorporation. These ex-
amples illustrate that we have a number of individual bank crises in the
sample.
In contrast to the stock returns, the high-yield bond spreads reported at
the bottom of tables 4.1 and 4.2 are maxima, as extreme positive values in-
dicate a situation of high risk. One can see that in times of stress, non-
investment grade corporate debt can trade at yields of more than 10 per-
cent above government debt.
There is also some ﬁrst evidence of clustering in extreme bank stock de-
clines, as many of them happen around a number of well-known crisis
episodes. For example, a signiﬁcant number of European and U.S.-based
banks faced record downward corrections around the end of the summer
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Management (LTCM) collapse (and perhaps also to the Russian default).
Another similar episode, very much limited to U.S. banks, happened in
spring and summer 2000, potentially related to the burst of the technology
bubble. Interestingly, record bank stock crashes around 11 September,
2001—the time of the New York terrorist attack—are registered for a num-
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Table 4.1 Historical minima, tail indexes and quantile estimates for excess stock returns of
euro area banks (%)
⏐Extreme negative returns⏐ ⏐Q ˆ(p)⏐
Bank X1,n(date) X2,n (date) X3,n (date)   ˆ p = 0.05 p = 0.02
DEUTSCHE 12.4 (09/11/01) 12.0 (03/09/00) 10.1 (09/19/01) 3.3 13.8 18.2
HYPO 17.3 (10/23/02) 14.3 (09/30/02) 11.5 (09/11/01) 3.1 17.9 24.0
DRESDNER 11.1 (10/28/97) 9.9 (07/22/02) 9.7 (03/09/00) 3.2 16.1 21.5
COMMERZ 13.3 (09/11/01) 13.1 (09/20/01) 13.1 (10/23/02) 2.9 15.9 21.9
BGBERLIN 37.9 (08/30/01) 27.0 (09/10/01) 17.1 (01/17/94) 2. 23.4 34.2
DEPFA 16.5 (11/29/00) 10.4 (10/08/98) 10.3 (07/23/02) 3.2 13.4 17.6
BNPPAR 12.5 (09/30/98) 11.2 (09/30/02) 11.0 (10/04/02) 3.0 15.4 20.8
CA 19.6 (11/19/01) 12.4 (07/12/01) 10.5 (09/12/02) 2.4 13.3 19.4
SGENERAL 12.5 (09/10/98) 11.6 (09/30/02) 10.4 (07/19/02) 2.7 17.1 23.6
NATEXIS 13.6 (10/08/97) 10.8 (09/25/96) 10.6 (03/25/94) 3.6 9.6 12.3
INTESA 12.7 (11/07/94) 12.2 (09/20/01) 11.6 (10/28/97) 3.9 13.7 17.4
UNICREDIT 10.9 (07/20/92) 10.3 (09/10/98) 9.9 (10/21/92) 3.6 12.9 16.7
PAOLO 9.9 (12/04/00) 9.7 (09/10/98) 9.5 (09/20/01) 3.5 13.3 17.3
CAPITA 18.2 (03/07/00) 12.0 (10/01/98) 11.5 (06/20/94) 3.3 16.7 24.6
SANTANDER 15.9 (10/01/98) 12.8 (01/13/99) 11.4 (07/30/02) 3.0 15.8 21.4
BILBAO 14.5 (01/13/99) 11.8 (09/10/98) 10.7 (09/24/92) 2.6 17.4 24.8
BANESP 84.8 (02/02/94) 18.9 (11/27/02) 15.5 (08/28/98) 2.2 20.1 30.6
ING 16.1 (10/15/01) 14.0 (10/02/98) 13.9 (09/11/01) 2.4 23.4 34.4
ABNAMRO 12.6 (09/14/01) 11.9 (09/11/01) 11.3 (09/30/02) 2.5 19.6 28.3
FORTIS 11.0 (08/01/02) 10.6 (09/30/02) 10.6 (09/11/01) 3.1 14.6 19.7
ALMANIJ 8.7 (11/26/99) 8.0 (04/30/92) 6.2 (08/01/02) 3.8 0.7 12.4
ALPHA 9.4 (04/27/98) 9.4 (09/09/93) 9.1 (01/13/99) 3.1 14.4 19.3
BCP 17.1 (10/23/02) 9.9 (02/25/03) 9.1 (04/16/99) 2.5 13.8 19.8
SAMPO 20.7 (08/17/92) 18.3 (12/21/92) 15.6 (08/26/92) 2.6 23.8 33.7
IRBAN 18.2 (02/06/02) 10.3 (10/08/98) 10.1 (10/28/97) 2.9 12.7 17.4
Bank index 6.9 (09/11/01) 6.7 (10/01/98) 6.3 (09/10/98) 2.5 11.2 16.1
Stock index 6.3 (09/11/01) 5.3 (10/28/97) 5.0 (09/14/01) 3.2 7.7 10.2
Yield spread 16.6 (10/02/01) 16.5 (10/03/01) 16.3 (10/01/01) 9.1 22.3 24.7
Source: The source of raw data is Datastream.
Notes:Returns and quantiles are reported in absolute values and therefore positive. X1,n, X2,n,and X3,nare
the three smallest daily excess returns in the sample for each bank or each index. The last line describes
the largest values (maxima) for high-yield bond spreads. Dates in parentheses are denoted XX/YY/ZZ,
where XX = month, YY = day, and ZZ = year.   ˆ is the tail index, estimated with the method by Hill
(1975). Q ˆ( p) is the estimated quantile (crisis level) for each bank, as implied by the estimated tail index
and the assumed percentile (crisis probability). The quantiles are calculated for two percentiles p that
correspond to an in-sample quantile (p = 0.05) and an out-of-sample quantile (p = 0.02). Data are from
2 April, 1992, to 27 February, 2004. See table 4D.1 for list of abbreviations.ber of European banks, but not for U.S. banks.13 Finally, some American
and European banks were hit signiﬁcantly by the onset of the Asian crisis
in fall 1997. These examples illustrate, ﬁrst, that our sample covers a num-
ber of stress situations in global and national markets,14 and second, that
they also indicate the relevance of systematic shocks for banking stability,
which motivates our tail-  indicator.
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13. The less extreme reactions of U.S. bank stocks may, however, also have to do with a four-
day suspension of trading at the New York Stock Exchange.
14. The presence of single and aggregate crisis situations in our sample is reassuring, as the
focus of our paper is ﬁnancial stability. At the same time, however, we would like to note that
extreme-value methods do not require the presence of individual or aggregate failures in the
Table 4.2 Historical minima, tail indexes, and quantile estimates for excess stock returns of
U.S. banks (%)
⏐Extreme negative returns⏐ ⏐Q ˆ( p)⏐
Bank X1,n(date) X2,n (date) X3,n (date)   ˆ p = 0.05 p = 0.02
CITIG 17.1 (07/23/02) 11.7 (07/22/02) 11.5 (10/27/97) 3.3 13.7 18.0
JP MORGAN 20.0 (07/23/02) 10.8 (09/03/98) 10.1 (09/13/00) 3.7 12.9 16.6
BAMERICA 11.6 (10/14/98) 10.7 (10/27/03) 9.1 (06/16/00) 3.6 12.0 15.5
WACHOVIA 9.2 (11/14/00) 9.1 (05/25/99) 9.0 (01/27/99) 3.5 10.9 14.1
FARGO 9.2 (06/16/00) 7.5 (06/08/98) 7.3 (04/14/00) 3.7 9.6 12.3
BONE 25.8 (08/25/99) 11.4 (11/10/99) 9.5 (10/27/97) 3.0 13.5 18.4
WASHING 11.7 (10/17/01) 10.3 (09/04/98) 9.3 (12/09/03) 3.5 12.7 16.5
FLEET 11.2 (07/16/02) 10.2 (02/21/95) 8.0 (07/23/02) 3.7 11.7 15.0
BNYORK 16.9 (12/18/02) 13.9 (07/16/01) 11.1 (10/03/02) 3.4 12.6 16.5
SSTREET 19.7 (04/14/93) 12.1 (03/21/03) 11.9 (10/12/00) 3.0 14.8 20.0
NTRUST 10.6 (10/03/02) 9.1 (04/14/00) 8.5 (05/25/00) 3.5 11.8 15.4
MELLON 13.0 (10/27/97) 10.6 (01/22/03) 9.8 (03/08/96) 3.3 12.7 16.7
BCORP 17.4 (10/05/01) 15.9 (06/30/92) 10.7 (10/04/00) 2.9 14.4 19.8
CITYCO 9.5 (04/14/00) 8.2 (10/27/97) 7.7 (02/04/00) 3.1 11.3 15.2
PNC 16.1 (07/18/02) 10.3 (10/17/02) 9.8 (01/29/02) 3.4 10.9 14.3
KEYCO 8.9 (08/31/98) 8.3 (03/07/00) 8.2 (06/30/00) 3.4 11.4 14.9
SOTRUST 10.6 (04/26/93) 10.3 (01/03/00) 9.7 (03/17/00) 3.1 12.0 16.2
COMERICA 22.7 (10/02/02) 9.1 (04/17/01) 9.1 (04/14/00) 3.4 10.7 14.0
UNIONBANK 36.4 (06/16/00) 15.5 (03/17/00) 10.9 (12/15/00) 3.0 15.1 20.6
AMSOUTH 20.9 (09/22/00) 15.0 (06/01/99) 6.9 (01/10/00) 3.5 9.4 12.2
HUNTING 18.3 (09/29/00) 10.4 (01/18/01) 10.0 (08/31/98) 3.1 13.2 17.8
BBT 8.2 (01/21/03) 7.2 (06/15/00) 7.0 (04/14/00) 3.4 10.1 13.2
53BANCO 8.5 (11/15/02) 7.3 (01/14/99) 7.0 (04/14/00) 3.8 9.6 12.3
SUTRUST 10.2 (0720/98) 9.5 (04/14/00) 8.9 (06/16/00) 3.2 10.6 14.2
REGIONS 11.2 (12/15/03) 9.1 (08/31/98) 8.5 (06/15/00) 3.5 10.2 13.2
Bank index 7.0 (04/14/00) 6.8 (07/23/02) 6.7 (10/27/97) 3.4 9.1 12.0
Stock index 7.0 (08/31/98) 6.8 (04/14/00) 6.8 (10/27/97) 3.7 6.3 8.0
Yield Spread 10.8 (10/10/02) 10.7 (10/09/02) 10.7 (10/11/02) 15.8 12.1 12.9
Source: The source of raw data is Datastream.
Notes: See table 4.1.We also report in tables 4.1 and 4.2 the estimated tail indexes   ˆ for indi-
vidual banks and for the stock indices. It turns out that they vary around
3, which is in line with the evidence presented in Jansen and de Vries (1991),
illustrating the well known nonnormality of stock returns and the non-
existence of higher-order moments. If anything, the tails of a number of Eu-
ropean banks seem to be slightly fatter (smaller  ) than the ones of U.S.
banks. In addition to the larger interbank lending in Europe referred to
earlier, this observation raises again the issue of whether systemic risk on
the European side of the Atlantic is more pronounced than on the other.
Another observation is that the yield spreads have much thinner tails than
stock index returns.
The right-hand sides of tables 4.1 and 4.2 show the estimated quantiles
for all the banks when assuming a common percentile (or crash probabil-
ity). In this paper, we experiment with percentiles p between 0.02 percent
and 0.05 percent (explicitly reporting results for the latter), as for these val-
ues the implied crisis levels tend to be close to or slightly beyond the his-
torical extremes (see left-hand side). In other words, there cannot be any
doubt about the fact that the phenomena considered constitute critical sit-
uations for banks. In terms of sensitivity analysis, all our qualitative results
reported subsequently are robust to varying the crash probability p, at least
within this range.
4.6 Bank Contagion Risk
In this section we report the results from our multivariate bank spillover
measure. We are trying to answer two main sets of questions: (1) how large
is bank contagion risk in euro area countries, and, in particular, what do
our stock market indicators suggest about the relative importance of the
risk of domestic spillovers between banks as compared to the risk of cross-
border spillovers? Answers to the latter question are particularly important
for macroprudential surveillance and for the ongoing debate about super-
visory cooperation and the structure of supervisory authorities in Europe.
(2) What do our indicators say about the relative size of bank contagion
risk when comparing the euro area with the United States? Is one banking
system more at risk than the other? The former set of questions is ad-
dressed in subsection 4.6.1 and the latter in subsection 4.6.2. In the present
section we still abstract from extreme systematic risk for the euro area and
U.S. banking system, as this is addressed in the following section (section
4.7). For expositional reasons, we also abstract here from changes of spill-
over risk over time, which are addressed in section 4.8.
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sample. In contrast to fully nonparametric and parametric approaches, our semiparametric
approach allows us to estimate reliably extremal behavior even beyond the sample bound-
aries.4.6.1 Euro Area
In order to assess the exposure of euro area banks to each other, as de-
rived from their extreme stock price comovements, we report in table 4.3
the estimation results for our measure (1). To keep the amount of infor-
mation manageable, we do not show the extreme dependence parameters
  that enter in the estimation of (1), and we only display the spillovers to
the largest banks of the countries listed on the left-hand side. We calculate
the co-crash probabilities conditional on the second (column P ˆ
1), second
and third (column P ˆ
2), second, third, and fourth (column P ˆ
3), and so on
largest banks from Germany (upper panel), from Spain (upper middle
panel), from Italy (lower middle panel) and from France (lower panel). All
probabilities refer to the crisis levels (extreme quantiles) reported in table
4.1 for p   0.05 percent.
For example, the value 22.4 percent in the row “Germany” and the col-
umn “P ˆ
1” in the upper panel refers to the probability that Deutsche Bank
(the largest German bank) faces an extreme spillover from HypoVereins-
bank (the second largest German bank). Going a few cells down, the value
11.2 percent describes the probability that Banco Santander Central His-
pano (the largest Spanish bank) faces an extreme spillover from Hypo-
Vereinsbank. The diﬀerence between these two values would suggest that
the likelihood of cross-border contagion could only be half of the likeli-
hood of domestic contagion. When going through the table more system-
atically (in particular through the columns for more than one conditioning
bank crash), it turns out that cross-border contagion risk is indeed gener-
ally estimated to be smaller than domestic contagion risk in the euro area
banking system. To pick just another example, the probability that the
largest French bank (BNP Paribas) faces an extreme stock price slump
given that the second (Crédit Agricole) and third largest French bank (So-
ciété Générale) have experienced one is a nonnegligible 35.9 percent (see
column P ˆ
2, upper middle panel, row “France”). The same probability for
the largest Italian bank (Banca Intesa) is 7.5 percent (see column P ˆ
2, upper
middle panel, row “Italy”). The probabilities in the ﬁrst row of each panel
are very often higher than the probabilities in the rows underneath.
There are also some exceptions, in particular among the bivariate prob-
abilities reﬂecting linkages between two large banks (column P ˆ
1). This is
not too surprising, as the largest players will have more extensive inter-
national operations, implying more scope for cross-border contagion. In
particular, Algemene Bank Nederland-Amsterdam Roterdam (ABN
AMRO)—the largest Dutch bank—is more aﬀected by problems of Hypo-
Vereinsbank than Deutsche Bank (26.5 percent   22.4 percent). Actually,
the linkages between Dutch and German banks tend to be among the
largest cross-border linkages in our sample. Other important cross-border
linkages exist between the top banks of France, Germany, the Netherlands,
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banks: Estimations







Germany 22.4 65.1 74.3 72.7 55.4
The Netherlands 26.5 54.1 70.1 43.0 34.2
France 8.2 25.2 35.8 31.0 16.2
Spain 11.2 17.4 24.2 44.1 40.3
Italy 7.5 13.6 12.9 7.5 10.8
Belgium 16.1 44.2 42.6 28.5 9.2
Ireland 4.0 5.5 5.4 24.7 16.5
Portugal 7.7 13.6 21.7 25.1 18.0
Finland 0.9 1.7 2.3 4.0 4.5
Greece 0.9 1.4 1.3 1.3 2.1
Conditioning banks: French
France 2.9 35.9 76.6
Germany 3.1 23.9 69.5
The Netherlands 8.2 48.7 71.8
Italy 1.5 7.5 13.1
Spain 3.3 27.4 70.1
Belgium 6.7 38.0 56.3
Ireland 1.0 1.8 6.9
Portugal 2.5 6.5 26.5
Finland 0.0 0.2 0.7
Greece 0.2 0.3 0.6
Conditioning banks: Italian
Italy 9.6 16.4 16.6
Germany 5.1 12.4 18.8
The Netherlands 7.2 16.1 18.0
Spain 4.6 11.7 14.6
France 5.2 7.3 8.6
Belgium 4.7 12.0 11.4
Ireland 1.6 2.6 5.1
Portugal 1.8 2.5 3.3
Finland 1.9 3.2 2.5












Notes: The table reports estimated extreme spillover probabilities between banks, as deﬁned
in (1). Each column P ˆ
j shows the spillover probabilities for the largest bank of the country
mentioned on the left-hand side conditional on a set of banks j from either the same countryand the top Spanish bank. Moreover, as in the case of BNP Paribas, Crédit
Agricole, and Société Générale, the largest institutions of a country must
not always be very strongly interlinked in the home market. As a conse-
quence, the French panel shows that ABN AMRO and Fortis—the largest
Belgian bank—are more exposed to the second and third largest French
bank than is BNP Paribas. The fact that Belgian and Dutch banks are as-
sociated with the largest cross-border spillover risks is also intuitive, since
the banking sectors of these countries are dominated by a small number of
very large international ﬁnancial conglomerates. Also, the results of De-
gryse and Nguyen (2004) and van Lelyveld and Liedorp (2004) suggest
their special exposure to cross-border risk.
Another observation from table 4.3 is that the main Finnish and Greek
banks, located in two countries next to the outside border of the euro area,
tend to be least aﬀected by problems of large banks from other euro area
countries. Something similar, but to a lesser extent, can be observed for Ire-
land and, with exceptions, for Portugal. Apparently, smaller banking sys-
tems located more in the periphery of the euro area are more insulated
from foreign spillovers than larger systems in the center. Overall, the level
of spillover risk seems to be economically relevant, both domestically 
and across borders, in particular when more than one large bank faces a
stock price crash. Contagion risk for single crashes tends, however, to be
markedly lower.
An interesting exception is Italy. While being a larger core country in the
euro area, it is much less aﬀected by problems in French, German, or Span-
ish banks than other core countries. This is also consistent with the ﬁnd-
ings of Mistrulli (2005). In addition, spillovers from the largest Italian
banks to other main banking systems in Europe seem also quite limited.
One explanation for this phenomenon could be the low penetration of the
Italian banking system from abroad and the limited number of acquisi-
tions by Italian banks in other European countries.15
The test results in table 4.4 show whether the diﬀerences between do-
mestic and cross-country contagion risk are statistically signiﬁcant or not.
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15. This must, however, not remain like this, as the recent acquisition of HypoVereinsbank
by UniCredito suggests.
or other countries. The number of conditioning banks varies from one to ﬁve for Germany
(top panel), one to three for France (upper middle panel), one to three for Italy (lower middle
panel), and one to two for Spain (bottom panel). For example, the P ˆ
2 column contains prob-
abilities for a stock market crash of the largest bank in each country, conditional on crashes
of the second and third largest bank in Germany, France, Italy, or Spain. All probabilities are
estimated with the extension of the approach by Ledford and Tawn (1996) described in sec-
tion 4.3 and reported in percentages. Univariate crash probabilities (crisis levels) are set to p=
0.05 percent.
Table 4.3 (continued)Table 4.4 Domestic versus cross-border extreme spillover risk among euro area
banks: Tests
Largest bank T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
Conditioning banks: German
The Netherlands –1.01 0.00 –0.50 0.66 0.59
France 1.61 1.58 1.20 0.83 1.52
Spain 0.98 2.51** 2.19** 0.50 0.21
Italy 1.56 2.58*** 3.10*** 2.59*** 1.91*
Belgium 0.12 0.26 0.83 0.98 1.86*
Ireland 2.08** –2.15** 3.78*** 1.36 1.51
Portugal 1.28 2.9** 1.90* 0.91 1.17
Finland 3.93*** 4.82*** 4.32*** 3.09*** 2.62***
Greece 3.61*** 4.47*** 4.44*** 3.28*** 2.66***
Conditioning banks: French
Germany –0.31 0.86 –0.39
The Netherlands –2.50** –1.11 –0.75
Spain –0.24 0.48 0.08
Italy 1.03 2.75*** 1.92*
Belgium –1.85* –0.51 0.37
Ireland 1.32 3.20*** 2.58***
Portugal 0.11 2.36** 1.04
Finland 3.56*** 3.96*** 3.93***
Greece 2.56** 3.73*** 3.65***
Conditioning banks: Italian
Germany 1.11 0.42 –0.09
The Netherlands 0.41 –0.17 –0.56
Spain 1.33 0.45 –0.01
France 0.96 1.27 –0.09
Belgium 1.01 0.31 –0.36
Ireland 2.50** 2.52** 1.46
Portugal 2.70*** 2.57** 2.07**
Finland 2.33** 2.10** 2.16**
Greece 3.90*** 3.59*** 3.34***
Conditioning banks: Spanish
Germany 1.41 1.04








Notes:The table reports the statistics for the cross sectional test (4.4.1). Within each panel the
degree of extreme domestic spillover risk is compared with the degree of extreme cross-border
spillover risk for a given ﬁxed number of conditioning banks. So, each T-statistic describes
whether the differences between domestic and cross-border values of   that entered the esti-
mations in table 4.3 are statistically signiﬁcant. For example, in the top panel the test statistic
in the row “The Netherlands” and the column T1indicates whether the difference between the
  for the spillover probability between ABN AMRO and HypoVereinsbank and the   be-Rows and columns refer to the same banks as in table 4.3, but the cells now
show T-statistics of the cross-sectional test described in subsection 4.4.2.
The null hypothesis is that domestic spillovers equal cross-border spill-
overs.16 The test statistics partly qualify the interpretation of some of the
contagion probabilities in table 4.3. Extreme cross-border linkages be-
tween Belgian, Dutch, French, German, and Spanish banks are not (sta-
tistically) signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from domestic linkages within the major
countries. In contrast, for Finland and Greece the null hypothesis is re-
jected in all cases. Moreover, the same happens in many cases for Ireland
and Portugal. So, severe problems of larger French, German, Italian, and
Spanish banks may create similar problems for other large banks at home
or in other central euro area countries, but often would do much less so for
the largest banks of those smaller countries close to the outside border of
the euro area. Hence, for the latter countries the tests of table 4.4 conﬁrm
the impression from the estimations in table 4.3.
The T-tests also conﬁrm the special situation of Italy among the larger
euro area countries. In many cases the exposure of Italian banks to foreign
problems is signiﬁcantly lower than domestic exposures in the other main
countries. In addition, the greater exposure of ABN AMRO to Crédit
Agricole (cross-border) than BNP Paribas to Crédit Agricole (domestic) is
statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. And, similarly, the greater ex-
posure of Fortis to Crédit Agricole (cross-border) than BNP Paribas to
Crédit Agricole (domestic) is signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
The probabilities in table 4.3 allow one to derive a relationship between
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16. The T-statistics result from comparing cross-border  -values with domestic  -values
(ceteris paribus the number of conditioning banks), as used for the spillover probabilities of
table 4.3. The estimation of tail dependence parameters  have been described in equation (7).
For example, the T-statistic in row Netherlands and column T1 in table 4.4 results from test-
ing whether the  -value for the largest Dutch bank (ABN AMRO) with respect to the second
largest German bank (HypoVereinsbank) signiﬁcantly diﬀers from the domestic  -value of
the largest German bank (Deutsche Bank) with respect to the second largest German bank
(HypoVereinsbank).
tween Deutsche Bank and HypoVereinsbank is statistically signiﬁcant. The null hypothesis is
that the respective two  s are equal. Insigniﬁcant T-statistics imply that the domestic and
cross-border spillover risks are indistinguishable. A signiﬁcant rejection with positive sign im-
plies that cross-border spillover risk is statistically smaller than its domestic counterpart; a re-
jection with negative sign implies that cross-border risk is larger than domestic risk. The crit-
ical values of the test are 1.65, 1.96, and 2.58 for the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels,
respectively.
***Indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at 1 percent signiﬁcance.
**Indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at 5 percent signiﬁcance.
*Indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at 10 percent signiﬁcance.
Table 4.4 (continued)the likelihood of a bank crash as a function of the number of other banks
crashing. In our previous paper on currencies, we have denoted this rela-
tionship between the probability of crises and the number of conditioning
events as “contamination function” (see Hartmann, Maddaloni, and Man-
ganelli 2003, ﬁgs. 1 to 7). Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003) speak in their inter-
national equity market contagion paper of “co-exceedance response curves.”
Gropp and Vesala (2004) apply the latter concept to European banks.
While the results in table 4.3 suggest that most contamination functions 
in European banking are monotonously increasing (as for currencies), at
least over certain ranges of conditioning events, there are also some excep-
tions. Witness, for example, the exposure of Banco Commercial Portugues
(the largest Portuguese bank) to problems of German banks. Going from
P ˆ
4 to P ˆ
5 implies a reduction in the crash probability of BCP.
Potential explanations for this phenomenon are “ﬂight to quality,”
“ﬂight to safety,” or “competitive eﬀects.” Some banks may beneﬁt from
the troubles at other banks, as, for example, depositors withdraw their
funds from the bad banks to put them in good banks. Such behavior has
been referred to by Kaufman (1988) in relation to U.S. banking history,
and Saunders and Wilson (1996) provide some evidence for it during two
years of the Great Depression. For a more recent time period, Slovin,
Sushka, and Polonchek (1999) ﬁnd regional “competitive eﬀects” in re-
sponse to dividend reduction and regulatory action announcements. Non-
monotonicity of contamination functions might also occur for the curse 
of dimensionality, as very few observations may enter the joint failure area
for more than two banks.
The ﬁnding of statistically similar spillover risk between major euro area
banks within and between some large countries could be important for sur-
veillance of the banking system and supervisory policies. One explanation
for it may be the strong involvement of those banks in the unsecured euro
interbank market. As these large players interact directly with each other,
and in large amounts, one channel of contagion risk could be the exposures
resulting from such trading. For example, Gropp and Vesala (2004) ﬁnd in-
terbank exposures at the country level to be a variable explaining part of
spillovers in default risk between European banks. One implication of the
similarity of domestic and cross-border spillover risks for some countries
is that macroprudential surveillance and banking supervision need to have
a cross-border dimension in the euro area. This is currently happening
through the Eurosystem monitoring of banking developments, through
the application of the home-country principle (the home supervisor con-
siders domestic and foreign operations of a bank), through the existence 
of various bilateral memoranda of understanding between supervisory
authorities, through multilateral “colleges” of supervisors for speciﬁc
groups, and now also through the newly established “Lamfalussy Com-
mittees” in banking. The results could provide some arguments in favor of
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and supervisory structures over time.
It is also interesting to see that in some smaller and less-central countries
in the area cross-border risk is more contained. This could suggest that
even the larger players from those countries are still less interlinked with
the larger players from the bigger countries. The existence of signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in the degree of cross-border risks between diﬀerent groups of
European countries could make the development of homogenous supervi-
sory structures more complicated.
Overall, one could perhaps conclude that the results so far suggest that
the still relatively limited cross-border integration of banking in the euro
area does not seem to eliminate any contagion risk among the larger play-
ers from some key countries to levels that are so low that they can be simply
ignored. This conclusion is also consistent with Degryse and Nguyen
(2004) and Lelyveld and Liedorp (2004), whose analyses of interbank ex-
posures suggest that risks from abroad may be larger than domestic risks
in the Belgian and Dutch banking systems. One explanation for the rele-
vance of cross-border bank risks could be that while bank mergers have
been mainly national and traditional loan and deposit business of banks
are only to a very limited extent expanding across national borders (see,
e.g., the recent evidence provided in Hartmann, Maddaloni, and Man-
ganelli 2003, ﬁgs. 10 and 11), much of the wholesale business of these large
players happens in international markets that are highly interlinked.
4.6.2 Cross-Atlantic Comparison
The next step in examining interbank spillovers consists of comparing
them between the euro area and U.S. banking systems. To do so, we calcu-
late for each system the tail dependence parameter   that governs the esti-
mate of the multivariate contagion risk measure (1). Notice that for each
continent  US and  EA are derived from all the extreme stock return link-
ages (bilateral and multilateral) between the respective N   twenty-ﬁve
banks, following the estimation procedure described in section 4.3.
As indicated in table 4.5, we obtain   ˆ US   0.39 and   ˆ EA   0.17. The evi-
dence thus suggests that overall contagion risk in the U.S. banking system
is higher than contagion risk among euro area banks (about two times).17
Moreover, knowing that for the case of independence   1/N   0.04, the
amount of multivariate linkage is of economically relevant magnitude. The
P ˆ values in the table describe the probability that all twenty-ﬁve banks in
the euro area or the United States crash, given that any of them crashes.
These probabilities illustrate that overall systemic risk related to the crash
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17. Strictly speaking, this and subsequent related statements in the main text make the
plausible assumption that the dependence structure is suﬃciently similar on both sides of the
Atlantic for the slowly varying function  (q) described in appendix A not to have a large im-
pact on relative probabilities.of a single bank is extremely low. Of course, multivariate contagion risk in-
creases for multiple bank crashes.
Is this diﬀerence between the United States and the euro area statisti-
cally signiﬁcant? We apply the cross-sectional stability test (7) described in
subsection 4.4.2, with the following null hypothesis:
H0 :  US    EA
It turns out that the T-statistic reaches T   7.25. In other words, our indi-
cators and tests suggest that the diﬀerence in systemic spillover risk be-
tween the United States and the euro area is statistically signiﬁcant, way
beyond the 1 percent conﬁdence level.
One explanation could be that in a much more integrated banking sys-
tem, such as that of the United States, areawide systemic risk is higher, as
banking business is much more interconnected. We examine this hypothe-
sis by also estimating the multivariate contagion risk for individual Euro-
pean countries. If the previous explanation was true, then overall systemic
spillover risk should not be lower within France, Germany, or Italy than it
is in the United States.18 The bottom part of table 4.5 shows that this is ac-
tually the case. Overall, domestic spillover risk in France and Germany is
about the same as in the United States; in Italy it is even larger than in the
United States (see also ﬁg. 4.1 in subsection 4.8.1). Our cross-sectional 
test cannot reject parameter equality between France and the United States
or between Germany and the United States, but it rejects it between Italy
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18. We thank Christian Upper for suggesting this exercise to us.
Table 4.5 Multivariate extreme spillover risk among euro area and U.S. banks
Estimations
Country/Area   ˆ P ˆ Cross-sectional test T
United States (N = 25) 0.39 2.8E-4 H0 :  U.S. =  EA
Euro area (N = 25) 0.17 6.7E-15 T = 7.25
Germany (N = 6) 0.42 1.5E-3
France (N = 4) 0.48 1.4E-2
Italy (N = 4) 0.62 0.6
Notes: The table reports in the column   ˆ the coefﬁcient that governs the multivariate extreme
tail dependence for all the banks of the countries/areas detailed on the left-hand side. In the
column P ˆ it shows the probability that all banks of a speciﬁc country/area crash given that
one of them crashes. Both statistics are estimates of systemwide extreme spillover risks. Uni-
variate crash probabilities (crisis levels) are set to p = 0.05 percent. The right-hand column
describes the cross-sectional test (4.4.1) for the whole United States and euro area banking
system. A positive (negative) test statistic indicates that the United States (euro area)   is
larger than the euro area (United States)  . The critical values of the test are 1.65, 1.96, and
2.58 for the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Note that   values for
countries/areas with different numbers of banks may not be comparable.and the United States (as Italy is even more risky). In other words, the
lower overall spillover risk in Europe is explained by the quite weak ex-
treme cross-border linkages.
Having said this, we note that there is some structural instability in the
extreme dependence of bank stock returns on both sides of the Atlantic.
As we will discuss in depth in section 4.8 following, the risk of spillovers has
quite generally increased in the course of our sample period. We will, how-
ever, also show that all our conclusions here are robust for taking structural
instability into account. The only caveat we have to keep in mind is that the
probabilities in table 4.3 represent averages across the whole sample pe-
riod, so that they tend to overestimate the risk of spillovers at the start of
the sample and underestimate it towards the end of the sample.
Looking ahead, the analysis in the present section suggests that—as the
European banking system integrates further over time—it could become
more similar to the U.S. system in terms of contagion risk. In other words,
the ongoing and gradual integration process should be accompanied by
appropriate changes in macroprudential surveillance and supervisory
structures.
4.7 Aggregate Banking System Risk
Next we turn to the analysis based on our measure of extreme systematic
risk. We are interested in assessing the extent to which individual banks
and banking systems are vulnerable to an aggregate shock, as captured by
an extreme downturn of the market risk factor or an extreme upturn of
high-yield bond spreads. Across this section we assume stability of esti-
mated tail- s over time. The same caveat applies as in the previous section,
as structural breaks of extreme systematic banking system risk are only
considered in section 4.8.
The results are summarized in tables 4.6 and 4.7for the euro area and the
United States, respectively, and for all measures of aggregate risk listed in
subsection 4.5.2. The diﬀerent stock indexes capture market risk, as in tra-
ditional asset pricing theory. The high-yield bond spread is also tested as 
a measure of aggregate risk. For example, Gertler and Lown (1999) have
shown that it can be a good predictor of the business cycle, at least in the
United States, and ﬂuctuations in economic activity are the most impor-
tant determinant of banks’ asset quality. Some might also regard high-
yield spreads as a particularly suitable indicator for crisis situations.
The upper part of the tables report tail- s for individual banks. To take
an example, the value 12.1 in the row “IRBAN” and column “stock index”
of table 4.6 means that a very large downturn in the general euro area stock
index is usually associated with a 12 percent probability that Allied Irish
Banks, a top Irish bank, faces an extreme stock price decline. The value
30.2 in row “BNPPAR” and column “stock index” suggests that the same
Banking System Stability 157probability for the largest French bank is substantially higher. Going more
systematically up and down the columns as well as moving to the right and
left in the rows, one can see (1) that tail- s can be quite diﬀerent across
banks, both in Europe and in the United States, and (2) that the relative
sizes of tail-  seem to be quite similar for diﬀerent measures of aggregate
risk. For example, a number of banks from some more peripheral and
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Table 4.6 Extreme systematic risk (tail- s) of euro area banks
Aggregate risk factor
Bank Bank index Stock index Global bank Global stock Yield spread
DEUTSCHE 51.1 35.0 25.6 13.0 3.8E-5
HYPO 22.3 20.8 9.3 5.5 0.1
DRESDNER 37.9 27.7 19.1 11.6 0.3
COMMERZ 39.5 30.8 15.2 13.9 0.2
BGBERLIN 2.8 1.6 0.8 0.7 0.8
DEPFA 6.2 7.3 3.0 2.9 3.4E-2
BNPPAR 42.1 30.2 23.2 13.2 2.7E-2
CA 9.2 6.7 1.6 2.0 0.4
SGENERAL 45.8 30.0 22.7 16.0 6.9E-2
NATEXIS 1.8 1.9 2.2 1.7 9.1E-3
INTESA 19.1 11.2 7.2 5.9 0.4
UNICREDIT 14.5 9.5 10.5 5.0 0.3
PAOLO 36.7 28.5 15.2 10.2 0.3
CAPITA 16.5 9.3 9.4 6.4 0.3
SANTANDER 36.4 33.4 17.4 14.5 0.6
BILBAO 41.6 31.1 20.4 13.4 0.6
BANESP 2.6 1.2 1.4 0.6 2.7E-3
ING 61.7 46.0 23.1 14.1 0.5
ABNAMRO 50.3 46.3 23.7 13.9 0.2
FORTIS 48.5 36.3 11.8 10.9 0.1
ALMANIJ 11.9 11.1 7.4 4.5 0.2
ALPHA 3.7 4.1 1.5 1.2 8.0E-3
BCP 17.0 11.9 9.3 7.5 0.3
SAMPO 2.7 2.2 3.4 1.4 2.1E-2
IRBAN 13.9 12.1 6.9 4.6 0.1
Average 25.4 19.4 11.6 7.8 0.2
Standard deviation 18.8 14.5 8.3 5.3 0.2
Note:The table exhibits the estimates of extreme systematic risk (2; tail- s) for individual euro
area banks and for the euro area banking system as a whole. The entries show the probability
that a given bank crashes given that a market indicator of aggregate risk crashes (or in the case
of the yield spread, booms). Results are reported for ﬁve different aggregate risk factors: the
euro area banking sector subindex, the euro area stock index, the world banking sector
subindex, the world stock index, and the euro area high-yield bond spread. Data for the euro
area yield spread are only available from 1998 to 2004. All probabilities are estimated with the
extension of the approach by Ledford and Tawn (1996) described in section 4.3 and reported
in percentages. Univariate crash probabilities (crisis levels) are set to p= 0.05 percent. The av-
erage and the standard deviation at the bottom of the table are calculated over the twenty-ﬁve
individual tail- s in the upper rows, respectively. See table 4D.1 for list of abbreviations.smaller euro area countries or smaller banks from large euro area countries
can have quite low tail- s. One interpretation of this result is that the more
local business of the latter banks exposes them less to aggregate euro area
risk. Similar cases can be found for the United States in table 4.7. For ex-
ample, some players focusing on regional or local retail business, such as a
savings and loans association like Washington Mutual, have relatively low
tail- s (in this speciﬁc case, 3 percent for the U.S. stock index as aggregate
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Table 4.7 Extreme systematic risk (tail- s) of U.S. banks
Aggregate risk factor
Bank Bank index Stock index Global bank Global stock Yield spread
CITIG 41.1 26.5 16.5 17.4 0.3
JPMORGAN 39.4 18.0 15.2 16.4 1.3
BOA 37.7 12.4 6.4 7.1 0.2
WACHO 27.2 9.6 8.6 9.3 0.5
FARGO 17.1 7.1 4.5 3.8 2.4E-2
BONEC 31.0 14.0 9.7 10.0 0.4
WASHMU 9.5 2.8 4.7 1.8 0.1
FLEET 38.8 13.1 10.6 10.1 0.6
BNYORK 25.2 12.9 10.9 11.3 1.0
STATEST 26.8 19.0 10.9 18.3 1.0
NOTRUST 26.7 17.4 12.0 10.0 0.9
MELLON 29.4 16.4 10.6 10.4 0.8
USBANC 19.6 6.6 7.8 4.8 0.3
CITYCO 32.3 8.9 7.4 6.7 0.2
PNC 25.8 12.7 10.2 8.9 0.3
KEYCO 24.9 8.4 6.1 6.1 0.2
SUNTRUST 32.0 11.7 8.9 7.8 0.3
COMERICA 24.0 13.5 7.1 7.1 0.5
UNIONBAN 11.2 3.9 5.9 3.8 0.1
AMSOUTH 15.1 7.5 8.7 6.4 0.3
HUNTING 17.5 7.0 8.3 6.0 0.1
BBT 19.9 6.6 5.3 5.4 0.2
53BANCO 21.7 8.6 4.9 3.6 0.2
SOTRUST 33.3 7.3 6.8 4.4 0.3
RFCORP 26.5 11.6 8.4 7.8 0.2
Average 26.2 11.3 8.6 8.2 0.4
Standard deviation 8.5 4.4 3.0 4.2 0.3
Notes: The table exhibits the estimates of extreme systematic risk (2; tail- s) for individual
U.S. banks and for the U.S. banking system as a whole. The entries show the probability that
a given bank crashes given that a market indicator of aggregate risk crashes (or in the case of
the yield spread, booms). Results are reported for ﬁve different aggregate risk factors: the U.S.
banking sector subindex, the U.S. stock index, the world banking sector subindex, the world
stock index, and the U.S. high-yield bond spread. All probabilities are estimated with the ex-
tension of the approach by Ledford and Tawn (1996) described in section 4.3 and reported in
percentages. Univariate crash probabilities (crisis levels) are set to p = 0.05 percent. The av-
erage and the standard deviation at the bottom of the table are calculated over the twenty-ﬁve
individual tail- s in the upper rows, respectively. See table 4D.1 for list of abbreviations.risk factor). In contrast, large and geographically broad banks—such as
Deutsche Bank, BNP Paribas, Citigroup, or JP Morgan Chase—exhibit
larger tail- s, as they are much more diversiﬁed.
The bottoms of tables 4.6 and 4.7 report the means and standard devia-
tions of tail- s across the twenty-ﬁve banks for each continent. Overall,
tail- s in Europe and in the United States are of similar order of magni-
tude, although the U.S. tail- s tend to be slightly less variable (except for
yield spreads). We can use a cross-sectional T-test to compare aggregate
banking risk across the Atlantic. Table 4.8 shows the average extreme de-
pendence parameters   ¯ derived from the individual   parameters govern-
ing the tail- s of the twenty-ﬁve banks on each continent. It also shows the
T-values for a test with the following null hypothesis:
H0 :   ¯ US    ¯ EA
The equality of extreme dependence between stock returns and the market
risk factor in Europe and the United States cannot be rejected.
When turning to extreme systematic risk associated with high-yield
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Table 4.8 Comparisons of extreme systematic risk across different banking systems
Aggregate risk factor
Banking system Bank index Stock index Global bank Global stock Yield spread
 US 0.87 0.79 0.78 0.77 0.55
 EA 0.86 0.83 0.80 0.76 0.53
 FR 0.85 0.82 0.79 0.76 0.50
 GE 0.86 0.84 0.80 0.76 0.53
 IT 0.88 0.83 0.82 0.78 0.57
Null hypothesis
 US =  EA 0.19 –0.94 –0.44 0.21 0.30
 US =  FR 0.34 –0.59 –0.32 0.14 1.18
 US =  GE 0.20 –1.05 –0.47 0.30 0.48
 US =  IT –0.08 –0.63 –0.81 –0.16 –0.48
Notes: The table exhibits the average tail dependence parameters   that govern the tail-  es-
timates reported in tables 4.6 and 4.7 for the United States, euro area, French, German, and
Italian banking system (upper panel) and the statistics of tests examining differences in ex-
treme systematic risk between the United States and euro area banking systems (lower panel).
Each  is calculated as the mean of tail-  dependence parameters across all the banks in our
sample for the respective country/area. The tests are applications of the cross-sectional test
(7). The null hypothesis is that extreme systematic risk in the U.S. banking system is the same
as in the other banking systems. A positive (negative) test statistic indicates that extreme sys-
tematic risk in the U.S. banking system (in the respective euro area banking system) is larger
than in the respective euro area (United States) banking system. The critical values of the test
are 1.65, 1.96, and 2.58 for the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. All re-
sults are reported for the ﬁve different aggregate risk factors: the euro area/United States
banking sector subindex, the euro area/United States stock index, the world banking sector
subindex, the world stock index, and the euro area/United States high-yield bond spread.
Univariate crash probabilities (crisis levels) are set to p = 0.05 percent.Banking System Stability 161
bond spreads (see the right-hand side of tables 4.6 and 4.7), the results are
diﬀerent. Tail- s for spreads are extremely small. Extreme positive levels
of spreads on average do not seem to be associated with a high likelihood
of banking problems. Quite the contrary—the probabilities are almost
zero. This also conﬁrms the simple correlation analysis referred to in sub-
section 4.5.2.
Accordingly, the tail dependence parameters   ¯ for spreads in table 4.8
are much smaller than the ones for stock indexes. Note that the mean
dependence parameters for yield spreads are all estimated to be quite 
close to the level associated with asymptotic independence for this two-
dimensional measure,  indep   1/N   0.5. Thus, it is no surprise that the 
T-tests show that—as for the market risk factor—the level of extreme ag-
gregate risk in the United States and in the euro area is statistically indis-
tinguishable.
We conclude from this that high-yield bond spreads are not very in-
formative about extreme aggregate banking system risk on both sides of
the Atlantic. This ﬁnding could mean, for example, that credit spreads are
a less-good predictor of business cycle ﬂuctuations—in particular of severe
ones—than previously thought. It could also mean that the banks in our
sample hold only a very limited amount of loans from borrowers that are
rated below investment grade. Still, future research could address whether
they have at least some incremental explanatory value for banking prob-
lems when other variables are controlled for as well.
4.8 Has Systemic Risk Increased?
A crucial issue for macroprudential surveillance and supervisory poli-
cies is whether banking system risks change over time. In particular, it
would be important to know whether they may have increased lately.
Therefore, we apply in the present section our multivariate application of
the structural stability test by Quintos, Fan, and Phillips (2001; see subsec-
tion 4.4.2) to the estimators of multivariate spillovers and systematic risk
(see subsections 4.8.1 and 4.8.2, respectively).
4.8.1 Time Variation of Bank Contagion Risk
We apply the recursive structural stability test described in subsection
4.4.1 and equations (B.1) through (B.4) of appendix B to the extreme tail
dependence parameters   that govern the spillover probabilities reported
in table 4.3. The null hypothesis of constancy of   for the cases in the table
is given by equation (B.3). The test results are reported in table 4.9, with the
diﬀerent cases structured in the same way as in tables 4.3 and 4.4.
Each entry ﬁrst shows the endogenously estimated break point, if any,
and then the value of the test statistic in parentheses. It turns out that the
forward version of the recursive test discovers a signiﬁcant upward breakTable 4.9 Domestic and cross-border extreme spillover risk among euro area banks:
Time variation
Largest bank   ˆ
1   ˆ
2   ˆ
3   ˆ
4   ˆ
5
Conditioning banks: German
Germany 3/31/97 (43.5) 8/1/97 (62.0) 4/2/97 (38.4) 8/15/97 (7.2) 7/23/97 (17.3)
The Netherlands 3/31/97 (81.1) 4/2/97 (77.9) 4/2/97 (66.2) 8/21/97 (16.9) 4/2/97 (7.3)
France 7/23/97 (25.6) 8/1/97 (37.5) 9/9/97 (41.2) 7/23/97 (19.3) 8/15/97 (8.4)
Spain 7/21/97 (68.8) 5/27/97 (39.7) 5/29/97 (55.9) 7/23/97 (18.9) 8/14/97 (5.5)
Italy 7/21/97 (49.2) 9/9/97 (46.2) 9/9/97 (41.4) 8/21/97 (20.2) 8/21/97 (9.3)
Belgium 8/21/97 (62.2) 4/2/97 (50.1) 3/27/97 (56.7) 7/23/97 (25.9) 6/12/98 (6.9)
Ireland 8/20/97 (43.0) 10/16/97 (24.3) 8/15/97 (21.9) 8/14/97 (11.3) 8/15/97 (4.7)
Portugal 9/9/97 (27.5) 1/14/94 (37.1) 1/25/94 (50.1) 7/23/97 (23.2) 7/23/97 (7.5)
Finland 10/16/97 (30.5) 10/16/97 (26/3) 5/23/94 (37.2) 8/22/97 (23.6) 7/23/97 (9.6)
Greece 3/27/97 (64.0) 3/27/97 (58.8) 4/2/97 (47.8) 3/27/97 (18.8) 8/15/97 (7.4)
Conditioning banks: French
France 2/15/02 (25.3) 9/19/00 (32.8) 6/17/94 (22.5)
Germany 10/9/00 (52.6) 11/21/00 (36.3) 5/21/96 (4.4)
The Netherlands 10/10/00 (54.4) 9/20/00 (44.9) 10/22/97 (39.0)
Italy 1/11/02 (20.1) 1/31/01 (37.8) 10/22/97 (32.5)
Spain 10/10/00 (34.3) 9/19/00 (40.6) 10/13/97 (32.1)
Belgium 9/1/00 (47.7) 11/27/01 (52.4) 6/9/98 (40.8)
Ireland 9/20/00 (13.8) 11/21/00 (19.4) 12/7/01 (12.2)
Portugal 1/25/02 (24.8) 1/29/02 (30.4) 10/22/97 (20.4)
Finland 4/14/00 (6.1) 5/31/94 (26.0) 11/4/96 (27.5)
Greece 6/11/98 (15.5) 2/28/97 (32.5) 2/28/97 (19.2)
Conditioning banks: Italian
Italy 9/30/97 (5.4) 9/25/97 (9.0) 9/30/97 (3.6)
Germany 7/25/97 (23.9) 7/25/97 (31.7) 10/8/97 (18.8)
The Netherlands 10/7/97 (16.6) 8/1/97 (27.7) 8/7/97 (18.7)
Spain 6/27/97 (7.6) 7/14/97 (19.9) 9/9/97 (12.1)
France 10/8/97 (9.9) 10/22/97 (8.3) 9/9/97 (7.9)
Belgium 7/31/97 (25.8) 8/1/97 (44.8) 10/8/97 (30.2)
Ireland 8/22/97 (4.9) 10/8/97 (7.0) 8/7/97 (6.7)
Portugal 8/1/97 (9.1) 8/1/97 (18.2) 8/7/97 (13.6)
Finland — 7/25/97 (8.5) 10/24/97 (5.9)
Greece 9/9/97 (15.3) 10/17/97 (19.2) 8/15/97 (13.4)
Conditioning banks: Spanish
Spain 7/16/97 (33.1) 7/16/97 (4.0)
Germany 3/17/97 (88.0) 5/21/97 (9.0)
The Netherlands 7/21/97 (39.0) 7/3/97 (7.3)
France 10/22/97 (34.6) 5/27/97 (5.4)
Italy 7/28/97 (33.2) 6/18/97 (3.8)
Belgium 7/17/97 (47.7) 2/25/97 (12.4)
Ireland 7/16/97 (22.7) —
Portugal 6/16/97 (42.7) 3/31/97 (12.8)
Finland 10/24/97 (21.3) 7/23/97 (3.9)
Greece 6/2/97 (37.9) 3/27/97 (12.4)
Notes: The table reports the results of tests examining the structural stability of the extreme spillover
risks documented in table 4.3. This is done by testing for the constancy of the   tail-dependence param-in spillover risk in almost every case, be it a domestic linkage or a cross-
border linkage. For spillovers conditioned on German, Italian, and Span-
ish banks, almost all increases in risk occur sometime during the year 1997.
If crashes of French banks are the conditioning events, breaks tend to oc-
cur somewhat later, most often around the year 2000. While there have
been economic events in the vicinity of the break point times found by the
test that could have contributed to increases in spillover risks (e.g., the
Asian ﬁnancial crisis, the end of the technology boom), we would not pay
too much attention to the exact dates. The reason is that further evidence,
presented subsequently, suggests that changes in risk exhibit fairly gradual
patterns, so that just singling out the most important break point could be
misleading.
These results suggest that there was also an increase in systemwide
spillover risks. We examine this question in table 4.10. We ﬁrst calculate the
25-dimensional (N   25) tail-dependence parameter values that span the
whole U.S. block   ˆ US and the whole euro area block   ˆ EA (as in subsection
4.6.2, table 4.5) and test for structural change. We do the same for Ger-
many (N   6), France (N   4), and Italy (N   4), separately. The null is
again as in equation (B3). Table 4.10 shows on the left-hand side break
points and test statistics for the full sample; in the middle of table 4.10 es-
timated subsample values for the diﬀerent  s are reported. Finally, the
right-hand side of the table also displays the results of two further struc-
tural stability tests, limited to the second half of the sample after the ﬁrst
endogenous break. The ﬁrst test is another Quintos, Fan, and Phillips en-
dogenous stability test, and the second an exogenous stability test (TEMU),
in which the break point is chosen to be 1 January, 1999, the start of eco-
nomic and monetary union in Europe.
The tests indicate a signiﬁcant upward break in euro area systemic risk
around mid-1996 (test value 4.9) and in U.S. systemic risk at the end of
1995 (test value 18.5). These breaks are both slightly earlier than the lower-
dimensional ones in table 4.9.19The extreme dependence parameter   ˆ USin-
creases from 0.20 to 0.41, and parameter   ˆ EAfrom 0.13 to 0.20. Gropp and
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19. One explanation for the earlier increase in fully systemic risk could be that the (many)
cases not covered in table 4.9 have earlier breaks than the ones shown.
eters (null hypothesis) that govern the spillover probabilities in table 4.3. Applying the recursive test (B1)
through (B4) by Quintos, Fan, and Phillips (2001) described in appendix B and subsection 4.4.1, each
cell shows the endogenously found break date and the test value in parentheses. Dates are denoted
XX/YY/ZZ, where XX = month, YY= day, and ZZ = year. The critical values of the test are 1.46, 1.78,
and 2.54 for the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. A test value exceeding these
numbers implies an increase in extreme dependence over time. The absence of a break over the sample
period is marked with a dash.
Table 4.9 (continued)Vesala (2004) also ﬁnd an increase in bank spillover risk in Europe, using
a diﬀerent methodology, but they impose the break point at the time of 
the introduction of the euro. For France, Germany, and Italy, our test also
indicates strong domestic upward breaks, but in addition France and
Germany experience a (weaker) downward break (as indicated by the
backward version of the test). In sum, we detect a signiﬁcant increase of
multivariate spillover risk both in the euro area and in the U.S. banking sys-
tem. Both systems seem to be more vulnerable to contagion risk today than
they have been in the early 1990s, the United States even more so than the
euro area.
The increase of spillover risk found for the United States is consistent
with the ﬁndings of de Nicoló and Kwast (2002), who detect an upward
trend of regular correlations between U.S. LCBOs during the period 1988
to 1999 and interpret it as a sign of increasing systemic risk.20 The authors
estimate that part of the increase is likely to be related to consolidation
among LCBOs. The timing of structural change in de Nicoló and Kwast’s
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20. Within the group of about twenty-two LCBOs, however, most of the increase in corre-
lations is concentrated among the less-complex banks.






Country/Area break test   ˆ
1   ˆ
2 Endogenous Exogenous
United States (N = 25) 11/22/95 (18.5) 0.20 0.41 3/11/97 (2.2) n.a.
Euro area (N = 25) 12/5/96 (4.9) 0.13 0.20 (B) 1/18/99 (3.2) (1.4)
Germany (N = 6) 7/23/97 (17.6) 0.24 0.52 — (1.9)
(B) 4/2/97 (2.1) (B) 1/22/99 (3.9)
France (N = 4) 6/17/94 (21.9) 0.19 0.52 12/7/01 (12.8) (–3.0)
(B) 5/21/96 (4.3) (B) 2/24/97 (3.0)
Italy (N = 4) 09/30/97 (3.4) 0.45 0.72 (B) 4/11/03 (2/2) (2.1)
Notes:The table reports tests and estimations assessing time variation in the multivariate spillover prob-
abilities of table 4.5. The column on the left displays estimated break dates and values from the recursive
Quintos, Fan, and Phillips (2001) test (B.1) through (B.4) described in appendix B and subsection 4.4.1
applied to the   parameter governing the extreme tail dependence of the banks located in the coun-
tries/areas displayed on the extreme left. Dates are denoted XX/YY/ZZ, where XX = month, YY = day,
and ZZ = year. The forward recursive version of the test is used, unless marked otherwise. (B) marks the
backward recursive version of the test. The critical values of the test are 1.46, 1.78, and 2.54 for the 10
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. The middle columns show pre- and postbreak esti-
mates for  . The columns on the right display two tests that assess the occurrence of further breaks in
the second half of the sample. The ﬁrst one is the same as the one on the left-hand side. The second one
is a simple differences-in-means test based on (7). The exogenous break point is chosen to be 1/1/99, the
time of the introduction of the euro. Critical values for this test are 1.65, 1.96, and 2.58 for the 10 per-
cent, 5 percent, and 1 percent signiﬁcance levels. Note that   values for countries/areas with different
numbers of banks may not be comparable.paper is not exactly the same as in ours but quite similar, as they ﬁnd most
correlation changes during 1996 and perhaps 1997. Mistrulli (2005) argues
that some increase in domestic contagion risk in the Italian banking sector
has been caused by new interbank lending structures that emerged from
consolidation. And the risk seems to pick up around 1997, similar to our
break points. Hence, banking consolidation may be one important expla-
nation for a higher contagion risk withinthe countries discussed. It is, how-
ever, a less likely explanation for the increase in   for the euro area bank-
ing system as a whole. The reason is that cross-border bank mergers are
still relatively rare in Europe (see, e.g., Hartmann, Maddaloni, and Man-
ganelli 2003, ﬁgure 10).
In order to get a better view of the evolution of multivariate contagion
risk over time, we plot in ﬁgure 4.1 the recursive estimates of   for the euro
area, the United States, France, Germany, and Italy. In addition to unﬁl-
tered results (solid lines), we also display results for GARCH-ﬁltered re-
turn data (dotted lines). For the reasons given in the ﬁrst subsection of ap-
pendix E, however, one should focus on the unﬁltered results. Comparing
the two upper panels of the ﬁgure, we can see the smaller and gradual char-
acter of the increase in spillover risk in the euro area. Notice the consis-
tency of this evolution with a slowly advancing integration process. Multi-
variate risk in the United States starts at a higher level and begins to rise
later, but at a much faster pace. The lower panels of the ﬁgure conﬁrm the
results discussed in subsection 4.6.2, insofar as general spillover risk within
France, Germany, and Italy is higher than in the euro area as a whole and,
on average, of a similar order of magnitude as within the United States.
(The results are qualitatively the same for ﬁltered data, although the
strength of changes is sometimes muted.21) All these ﬁndings are consistent
with the hypothesis advanced in section 4.6—that banks are more exposed
to each other within a country than across borders. So far, this remains true
even in the euro area, which shares a common currency and a common in-
terbank market.
Figure 4.2 shows the recursive statistics of the cross-sectional tests com-
paring U.S. multivariate spillover risk with euro area, French, German,
and Italian spillover risk. We would like to learn from this whether the sim-
ilarities and diﬀerences in multivariate risk across those banking systems
established in section 4.6 generally hold across our sample period. Each
panel exhibits the diﬀerence in   between the ﬁrst country (always the
United States) and the second area or country. The straight dashed lines
describe two standard deviation conﬁdence intervals. So, when a solid
curve moves out of a conﬁdence interval, then the test rejects the equality
Banking System Stability 165
21. A similar phenomenon for general stock market data has already been observed by
Poon, Rockinger, and Tawn (2004). In the working paper version of the present paper we dis-
play a larger number of the results for ﬁltered data (Hartmann, Straetmans, and C. de Vries
2005, appendix E). The second section of appendix E brieﬂy summarizes them.of multivariate tail-dependence parameters between the two countries. If a
curve is above the conﬁdence interval, then the ﬁrst country is more sus-
ceptible to contagion. In the opposite case, the second country is the more
risky one. We can immediately conﬁrm from the upper left-hand chart in
ﬁgure 4.2 that the United States is more risky than the euro area, except for
the very start of the sample. The lower right-hand chart illustrates that
Italy is more risky than the United States.
Finally, we turn to the results of the two structural stability tests for the
second half of the sample on the right of table 4.10. Interestingly enough,
the endogenous test (backward version) ﬁnds a second break point for the
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Fig. 4.1 Evolution of multivariate extreme spillover risk among euro area and
U.S. bankseuro area in January 1999 reducing   (test value 3.2 compared to a critical
value of 2.6 for a signiﬁcant change at the 1 percent level). In other words,
it indicates that multivariate contagion risk decreased in parallel with the
introduction of the euro. As we are concerned about the validity of the as-
ymptotic properties of the Quintos, Fan, and Phillips test when it is applied
in a sequential way, we also conduct an exogenous stability test for which
we impose 1 January, 1999, as the break point. This test exploits the as-
ymptotic normality of the tail dependence parameter, as in the case of
cross-sectional diﬀerences discussed earlier. It conﬁrms that there is some
decline in  EAat the time of the euro changeover, but this decline is not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant (test value 1.4 compared to a critical value of 1.9 for a
signiﬁcant change at the 5 percent level).
While it is often assumed that the introduction of the euro with a com-
mon money market should have led to an increase in contagion risk in the
euro area, our results do not provide any evidence of that actually hap-
pening. On the contrary, if anything there was a slight decrease of multi-
variate extreme dependence between all euro area banks. One explanation
for such a development would be as follows. Whereas the introduction of a
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Fig. 4.2 Comparisons of the evolution of extreme bank spillover risk 
across countriessingle currency with a common (and fully integrated) money market could
increase the interbank linkages between banks across borders, and thereby
the risk of contagion, on the other hand the much larger and more liquid
money market as well as the wider access to diﬀerent contingent claims un-
der a single currency could also increase the money market’s resilience
against shocks and improve risk sharing. If the latter eﬀects dominate the
former, then the banking system could well become less prone to extreme
spillovers.
As for the three larger euro area countries, Germany experiences a sim-
ilar reduction in risk as the area as a whole. But in this case the reduction
is also statistically signiﬁcant for the exogenous break test, at least at the 
10 percent level. France and Italy also have some further breaks. While
statistically signiﬁcant, they do not happen in the vicinity of the euro
changeover. The United States banking system faces a further increase in
multivariate spillover risk at the end of 1997.
We close this subsection with a word of caution. While the evidence sup-
porting increases in multivariate extreme dependencies among banks in
both the euro area and the United States seems statistically relatively
strong, we should not forget that our sample period extends only over
twelve years. This means, ﬁrst, that we cover only a small number of eco-
nomic cycles.22 Since there was a relatively long upturn during the 1990s,
there may be a risk that this had an impact on extreme bank stock return
dependence. More generally, similar to correlation, extreme dependence
can oscillate over time. Obviously, we cannot know whether there was
already a period of higher extreme linkages between banks before our
sample starts or whether the high linkages observed toward the end of our
sample will come down again in the future.
4.8.2 Time Variation of Aggregate Banking System Risk
Lastly, we apply the structural stability test to extreme systematic risk in
banking systems. More precisely, we study whether the bivariate extreme
dependence parameters   that enter our estimates of tail- s have changed
between 1992 and 2004. Table 4.11 reports the results for each euro area
bank in our sample and table 4.12for each U.S. bank. Each table shows for
the respective banks the estimated break points, if any, with test values in
parentheses. Tests are performed for all aggregate risk measures on which
we condition the tail- s.
The general result is that extreme systematic risk has increased over
time. In other words, both the euro area and the U.S. banking system seem
to be more exposed to aggregate shocks today than they were in the early
1990s. We further illustrate this at the systemwide level in ﬁgure 4.3, which
gives us a better insight into the time evolution of extreme systematic risk.
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22. Following the NBER and CEPR business cycle dating programs, we cover at most two
full cycles; see http://www.nber.org/cycles.html and http://www.cepr.org/data/Dating/.The lines in the two panels refer to averages of  s across the twenty-ﬁve
euro area and twenty-ﬁve United States banks, respectively. We choose the
general local stock indexes as aggregate risk factors, but the picture is
unchanged for other stock indexes. Similar to ﬁgure 4.1 for interbank spill-
over risk, the  -values entering the ﬁgure are calculated recursively. One
can see that the increase in aggregate banking system risk is also econom-
ically signiﬁcant, both in the euro area and in the United States.23While re-
sults corrected for time-varying volatility (GARCH-ﬁltered returns) are
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Table 4.11 Extreme systematic risk (tail- s) of euro area banks: Time variation
Aggregate risk factor
Bank Bank index Stock index Global bank Global stock Yield spread
DEUTSCHE 3/12/97 (45.3) 3/12/97 (57.7) 8/15/97 (53.3) 12/5/96 (86.1) 9/14/00 (153.4)
HYPO 7/21/97 (40.1) 10/22/97 (60.0) 9/9/97 (62.8) 10/22/97 (60.5) 10/4/00 (124.1)
DRESDNER 8/1/97 (69.1) 12/5/96 (53.1) 12/5/96 (48.5) 12/5/96 (59.5) 8/22/00 (44.1)
COMMERZ 7/21/97 (22.8) 3/19/97 (34.8) 8/1/97 (30.4) 8/21/97 (70.4) 10/3/00 (142.7)
BGBERLIN 12/3/96 (7.9) 12/3/96 (10.9) 12/5/96 (11.8) 7/3/97 (19.2) 1/4/01 (496.6)
DEPFA 7/5/96 (33.7) 7/15/96 (37.6) 8/21/97 (19.4) 8/12/97 (33.6) 9/13/00 (97.5)
BNPPAR 8/15/97 (34.7) 7/17/97 (41.1) 10/22/97 (27.5) 8/27/97 (34.0) 9/15/00 (77.3)
CA 10/5/00 (50.4) 9/19/00 (52.7) 10/9/00 (26.6) 9/19/00 (31.7) 7/21/00 (127.3)
SGENER 10/22/97 (40.9) 10/22/97 (35.4) 10/22/97 (37.4) 10/22/97 (42.6) 9/21/00 (114.5)
NATEXIS 12/5/96 (6.0) 12/3/96 (8.5) 8/28/97 (11.0) 8/28/97 (21.1) 9/15/00 (155.1)
INTESA 7/31/97 (25.6) 7/28/97 (39.7) 9/9/97 (14.5) 7/31/97 (24.4) 7/24/00 (183.9)
UNICRED 10/8/97 (23.8) 9/25/97 (14.2) 10/8/97 (18.7) 9/9/97 (18.0) 9/11/00 (123.4)
PAOLO 7/28/97 (52.6) 9/25/97 (51.4) 10/24/97 (43.8) 10/8/97 (58.7) 8/17/00 (218.4)
CAPITA 8/12/97 (17.0) 9/10/97 (15.7) 9/9/97 (13.1) 9/9/97 (16.0) 9/15/00 (170.6)
SANTANDER 7/23/97 (60.3) 5/27/97 (64.0) 8/21/97 (28.3) 10/8/97 (51.5) 9/15/00 (207.3)
BILBAO 10/8/97 (54.0) 10/16/97 (58.7) 10/7/97 (36.2) 10/22/97 (68.7) 9/11/00 (209.3)
BANESP 5/16/97 (6.3) 10/16/97 (5.3) 10/22/97 (2.5) 10/22/97 (2.3) 7/21/00 (29.3)
ING 11/26/96 (43.7) 10/22/96 (36.4) 8/21/97 (57.2) 7/5/96 (51.7) 9/20/00 (186.5)
ABNAMRO 11/26/96 (48.1) 12/5/96 (56.3) 7/4/96 (73.9) 7/4/96 (61.6) 9/15/00 (132.5)
FORTIS 3/17/97 (65.4) 12/10/96 (41.1) 12/10/96 (33.0) 7/17/97 (36.7) 9/15/00 (161.2)
ALMANIJ 3/14/97 (59.4) 1/23/97 (56.7) 1/23/97 (54.5) 8/7/97 (77.1) 9/14/00 (238.2)
ALPHA 2/24/97 (52.7) 2/27/97 (64.5) 1/8/97 (36.6) 2/6/97 (66.1) 9/29/00 (80.7)
BCP 6/16/97 (37.8) 7/3/97 (42.2) 8/26/97 (28.7) 7/17/97 (57.6) 9/15/00 (129.0)
SAMPO 10/16/97 (15.2) 10/24/97 (15.6) 10/24/97 (6.0) 10/16/97 (11.5) 8/16/00 (151.6)
IRBAN 8/12/97 (22.4) 3/12/97 (25.2) 8/21/97 (16.5) 8/20/97 (25.3) 9/29/00 (164.7)
Notes: The table reports the results of tests examining the structural stability of the extreme systematic
risks of euro area banks documented in table 4.6. This is done by testing the constancy of the   tail-
dependence parameters (null hypothesis) that govern the tail- s in table 4.6. Applying the recursive test
(B1) through (B4) by Quintos, Fan, and Phillips (2001) described in appendix B and subsection 4.4.1,
each cell shows the endogenously found break date and the test value in parentheses. Dates are denoted
XX/YY/ZZ, where XX = month, YY = day, and ZZ = year. The critical values of the test are 1.46, 1.78,
and 2.54 for the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. A test value exceeding these
numbers implies an increase in extreme dependence over time. See table 4D.1 for list of abbreviations.
23. Notice that these results are diﬀerent from the ones by de Nicoló and Kwast (2002) us-
ing standard market model  s among U.S. LCBOs. They do not identify any increase of thesomewhat more muted, qualitatively they are unchanged (see also the sec-
ond subsection of appendix E). Moreover, the similarity of extreme aggre-
gate banking system risk in the euro area and the United States established
in section 4.7 seems to be valid for the entire sample period.
Table 4.11 locates the timing of most European break points for the
stock indexes around 1997 and for some cases in 1996. In the United States
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Table 4.12 Extreme systematic risk (tail- s) of U.S. banks: Time variation
Aggregate risk factor
Bank Bank index Stock index Global bank Global stock Yield spread
CITIG 12/20/96 (28.0) 12/15/95 (17.8) 10/22/97 (34.0) 10/23/97 (30.8) 10/20/00 (93.5)
JPMORGAN 2/25/97 (34.1) 3/11/97 (28.3) 10/13/97 (33.1) 10/16/97 (40.0) 10/17/00 (87.4)
BOA 12/2/96 (27.4) 12/10/96 (27.9) 11/29/96 (33.1) 12/2/96 (38.6) 9/15/00 (64.7)
WACHO 3/10/97 (14.9) 12/10/96 (22.0) 2/26/97 (66.4) 2/26/97 (41.3) 10/10/00 (64.5)
FARGO 1/3/96 (14.4) 12/15/95 (14.7) 2/27/97 (23.4) 2/26/97 (15.6) 10/5/00 (35.4)
BONEC 12/6/95 (23.7) 12/13/95 (32.3) 11/29/96 (47.6) 2/19/96 (40.3) 10/5/00 (98.8)
WASHMU 2/27/97 (8.1) 2/23/96 (10.6) 10/16/97 (20.2) 2/24/97 (9.9) 11/21/00 (33.6)
FLEET 4/22/98 (33.8) 12/10/96 (25.5) 4/17/98 (39.2) 12/10/96 (36.2) 11/30/00 (52.6)
BNYORK 2/19/96 (20.2) 1/8/96 (17.7) 12/11/96 (41.3) 2/6/97 (47.0) 9/19/00 (77.8)
STATEST 3/11/97 (35.8) 12/2/96 (49.4) 12/2/96 (41.7) 10/16/97 (58.2) 10/5/00 (158.3)
NOTRUST 11/29/96 (33.8) 12/2/96 (51.7) 10/22/97 (35.3) 12/5/96 (52.8) 9/29/00 (107.8)
MELLON 12/4/95 (13.4) 12/13/95 (25.4) 10/24/97 (38.3) 10/24/97 (26.0) 10/11/00 (108.6)
USBANC 2/25/97 (40.1) 1/23/97 (48.3) 9/25/97 (57.9) 9/25/97 (39.5) 11/10/00 (37.0)
CITYCO 11/29/96 (26.7) 12/2/96 (28.8) 11/29/96 (45.9) 12/2/96 (44.7) 10/10/00 (38.9)
PNC 12/10/96 (24.3) 12/13/95 (26.3) 12/10/96 (34.6) 3/7/96 (34.5) 11/30/00 (51.6)
KEYCO 12/2/96 (12.1) 12/6/95 (18.1) 12/5/96 (19.5) 12/2/96 (27.3) 9/28/00 (56.7)
SUNTRUST 12/2/96 (29.0) 12/13/95 (38.7) 12/5/96 (31.8) 12/5/96 (31.6) 10/20/00 (40.8)
COMERICA 1/3/96 (11.3) 12/13/95 (17.9) 2/25/97 (27.8) 1/8/96 (23.4) 10/11/00 (64.2)
UNIONBAN 7/21/97 (29.6) 10/24/97 (44.6) 6/26/97 (6.4) 10/23/97 (17.2) 9/26/00 (19.6)
AMSOUTH 12/19/95 (18.4) 1/8/96 (24.9) 12/10/96 (23.8) 1/1/97 (17.5) 9/19/00 (45.4)
HUNTING 2/6/97 (34.2) 1/22/97 (67.3) 10/13/97 (29.9) 10/16/97 (40.9) 10/5/00 (30.3)
BBT 3/28/97 (22.3) 3/28/97 (24.7) 10/22/97 (16.7) 10/29/97 (19.4) 9/19/00 (24.6)
53BANCO 12/2/96 (31.6) 12/2/96 (26.2) 12/5/96 (59.2) 4/9/97 (34.3) 10/16/00 (42.0)
SOTRUST 2/26/97 (47.4) 2/24/97 (36.6) 10/13/97 (35.6) 10/8/97 (44.2) 12/1/00 (41.5)
RFCORP 3/7/96 (36.4) 2/23/96 (40.7) 12/10/96 (23.3) 12/10/96 (33.9) 10/10/00 (24.0)
Notes: The table reports the results of tests examining the structural stability of the extreme systematic
risks of U.S. banks documented in table 4.7. This is done by testing for the constancy of the   tail-
dependence parameters (null hypothesis) that govern the tail- s in table 4.7. Applying the recursive test
(B1) through (B4) by Quintos, Fan, and Phillips (2001) described in appendix B and subsection 4.4.1,
each cell shows the endogenously found break date and the test value in parentheses. Dates are denoted
XX/YY/ZZ, where XX = month, YY = day, ZZ = year. The critical values of the test are 1.46, 1.78, 2.54
for the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. A test value exceeding these numbers im-
plies an increase in extreme dependence over time. See table 4D.1 for list of abbreviations.
impact of the general market index on LCBO stock returns between 1992 and 1999. They only
observe an increase of the impact of a special sectoral LCBO index in late 1992/early 1993,
conditional on the general market index.they happen somewhat earlier, with many breaks in 1996 (table 4.12). For
Europe the timing is roughly in line with, but not identical to, interbank
spillover risks (see the previous subsection). For the United States the tail-
  breaks happen somewhat later than the contagion breaks. Similar to the
spillover risks discussed earlier, the time evolution visible in ﬁgure 4.3,
however, suggests that not too much importance should be given to the ex-
act break dates.
We just mention that economically relevant tail-  changes occur for
some of the most important players, such as the largest U.S. banks (Citi-
group and JP Morgan Chase). The  s of important clearing banks, such as
Bank of New York, State Street, or Northern Trust, changed as well, some-
times by even more than the former. The main U.S. clearers also have some
of the statistically most signiﬁcant breaks (table 4.12). Similarly signiﬁcant
changes can also be observed for the euro area.
Both in Europe and in the United States there are also breaks in tail- s
for yield spreads. They happen, however, with surprising regularity in
2000, the time of the burst of the technology bubble. In any case, given the
very low extreme systematic risk associated with yield spreads, not too
much importance should be given to this result. Finally, the same words of
caution about business cycles and time-varying comovements should be
kept in mind as for the previous subsection.
4.9 Conclusions
In this paper we made a new attempt to assess banking system risk by
applying recent multivariate extreme-value estimators and tests to excess
returns of the major banks in the euro area and the United States. We dis-
tinguish two types of measures, one capturing extreme spillovers among
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Fig. 4.3 Evolution of extreme systematic risk in the euro area and the U.S.
banking systemsbanks (contagion risk) and another capturing the exposure of banks to ex-
treme systematic shocks (which we denote as tail- ). We compare the im-
portance of those forms of systemic risk across countries and over time.
Our results suggest that bank spillover risk in the euro area is signiﬁ-
cantly lower than in the United States. As domestic linkages in the euro
area are comparable to extreme linkages among U.S. banks, this ﬁnding
appears to be related to weak cross-border linkages in Europe. For ex-
ample, the largest banks of some smaller countries at the periphery of the
area seem to be more protected from cross-border contagion risk than
some of the major European banks originating from some central Euro-
pean countries. Extreme systematic risk for banks seems to be roughly
comparable across the Atlantic. In contrast to stock indexes, high-yield
bond spreads in general do not seem to be very informative about aggre-
gate banking risks. Structural stability tests for both our banking system
risk indicators suggest a general increase in systemic risk taking place over
the second half of the 1990s, both in Europe and the United States. We do
not ﬁnd, however, that the introduction of the euro had any adverse eﬀect
on cross-border banking risks, quite the contrary. Overall, the increase of
risk in the euro area as a whole seems to have happened extremely gradu-
ally, as one would expect from the slow integration of traditional banking
business. For the United States it may be noteworthy that some of the
strongest increases in extreme systematic risk seem to be concentrated
among the largest players and the main clearing banks.
Our results provide some interesting perspectives on the ongoing debate
on ﬁnancial stability policies in Europe. For example, the benchmark of
the United States seems to indicate that cross-border risks may further in-
crease in the future, as banking business becomes better integrated. At the
same time, it should be recognized that the direction of this process is not
unique to Europe. And in addition, our twelve-year sample period includes
one long economic cycle that may have overemphasized commonality in
banking risks. Keeping these caveats in mind, the results in this paper un-
derline the importance of macroprudential surveillance that takes a cross-
border perspective, in particular in Europe. They also encourage further
thinking about the best institutional structures for supervision in a Euro-
pean banking system that slowly overcomes the barriers imposed by na-
tional and economic borders. While important steps have already been
taken in this regard, if one thinks for example of the newly established
Lamfalussy Committees in banking, it is nevertheless important to prepare
for a future that may be diﬀerent from the status quo.
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Estimation of the Indicators of 
Banking System Stability: Details
In this appendix we discuss a number of more technical issues describing
the estimators for (1) and (2) that had to be left out in section 4.3.
The ﬁrst issue concerns the variable transformation from Xi to X ˜
i. It is
important to stress that the dependence between two random variables and
the shape of the marginal distributions are unrelated concepts. To extract
the dependence, given by the copula function, it is convenient to transform
the data and remove any possible inﬂuences of marginal aspects on the
joint tail probabilities. One can transform the diﬀerent original excess re-
turns to ones with a common marginal distribution (see, e.g., Ledford and
Tawn, 1996; Draisma et al., 2001). After such a transformation, diﬀerences
in joint tail probabilities across banking systems (e.g., Europe versus the
United States) can be solely attributed to diﬀerences in the tail-dependence
structure of the extremes. This is diﬀerent, for example, from correlation-
based measures that are still inﬂuenced by the diﬀerences in marginal dis-
tribution shapes.
In this spirit we transform the bank stock excess returns (X1,  ...,  Xi, ...,
XN) to unit Pareto marginals:
X ˜
i   , i   1 ,  ...,  N,
with F i( ) representing the marginal cumulative distribution function (cdf)
for Xi. However, since the marginal cdfs are unknown, we have to replace
them with their empirical counterparts. For each Xithis leads (with a small
modiﬁcation to prevent division by 0) to:
(A.1) X ˜
i   , i   1 ,  ...,  N,
where RXi   rank(Xil, l   1 ,  ...,  n). Using this variable transform, we can








i   q ,
where q   1/p.24
In this way the multivariate estimation problem can be reduced to esti-
mating a univariate exceedance probability for the cross-sectional mini-
mum of the N bank excess return series:
n   1
  
n   1 – RXi
1
  
1   F i(Xi)
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24. The multivariate probability stays invariant under the variable transformation (X1,  ...,
Xi,  ...,  XN) → (X ˜
1,  ...,  X ˜
i,  ...,  X ˜
N), because the determinant of the Jacobian matrix can be








i   q]   P(X ˜
min   q).
The marginal tail probability at the right-hand side can be calculated,
provided the following additional assumption on the univariate tail behav-
ior of X ˜
min is made. Ledford and Tawn (1996) argue that the bivariate de-
pendence structure is a regular varying function under fairly general con-
ditions. Peng (1999) and Draisma et al. (2001) give suﬃcient conditions
and further motivation. Therefore, we assume that the auxiliary variable
X ˜
min has a regularly varying tail. Notice, however, that in contrast to Led-
ford and Tawn (1996) we often consider more than two dimensions.25
Another issue is the approximate nature of equation (4), as described in
section 4.3. Assuming that X ˜
min exhibits heavy tails with tail index   1/ ,
then the regular variation assumption for the auxiliary variables implies
that the univariate probability in equations (3) or (A.2) exhibits a tail de-
scent of the Pareto type:
(A.3) P(X ˜
min   q) ≈  (q)q 1/ ,   1,
with q large (p small) and where  (q) is a slowly varying function (i.e.,
limq→   [xq]/ [q]   1 for all ﬁxed x   0). As  (q) is unlikely to have signif-
icant eﬀects on our results, we neglected it in the main body of the paper.
From equations (4) and (A.3) one sees that a higher   implies, ceteris
paribus (given the slowly varying function  [q]), a higher degree of de-
pendence among the components (X ˜
1,  ...,  X ˜
i,  ...,  X ˜
N) from equations (4)
or (A.2) far out in their joint tail. We can distinguish the two extreme cases
in which the X ˜
i, are asymptotically dependent and asymptotically indepen-





max   q)   P(maxN
i 1[X ˜
i]   q]. Examples of asymptotically de-
pendent random variables include the multivariate Student-Tdistribution,
for example. For asymptotic independence of the random variables   1,
we have that
P(X ˜
min   q)
  
P(X ˜
max   q)
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25. Equations (3) and (A.2) require a common quantile q. This can, however, be easily gen-
eralized to the case where qdiﬀers across the marginals. Assume that we allow both the quan-
tiles of the original distribution function Q1 and Q2 and the corresponding marginal proba-
bilities p1 and p2 to be diﬀerent from each other. For the bivariate case this would imply, for
example, that
P[X1   Q1(p1), X2   Q2(p2)]   P(X ˜
1   q1, X ˜
2   q2),
with qi   1/pi(i   1, 2). By multiplying X ˜
2 with q1/q2 the above joint probability again reduces
to a probability with a common quantile q1 and we are back to the framework described pre-
viously, where the loading variable X ˜
min can be calculated.(A.4) lim
q→ 
  0.
An example of this case is the bivariate standard normal distribution with
correlation coeﬃcient  . For this distribution   (1    )/2 and the limit
(A.4) applies. When the normal random variables are independent (  0),
one immediately obtains that   1/2. In general, whenever the X ˜
i are fully
independent in the N-dimensional space,   1/Nand P(X ˜
min  q)  pN. But
the reverse is not true; that is, there are joint N-dimensional distributions
with nonzero pairwise correlation that nevertheless have   1/N. The
Morgenstern distribution constitutes an example of this tail behavior. (A
bivariate version is employed in a Monte Carlo exercise in appendix C.1.)
The estimation of equation (4) with the de Haan et al. estimator (5) and
the Hill estimator (6) has already been sketched in the main text. One may
still want to remark that, technically, the “tail cut-oﬀ point” Cn–m,n in equa-
tion (5) is the (n – m)-th ascending order statistic from the cross-sectional
minimum series X ˜
min. Similarly, m is the number of higher-order extremes
that enter the estimation of (6). The estimator (5) basically extends the em-
pirical distribution function of X ˜
min outside the domain of the sample by
means of its asymptotic Pareto tail from equation (4). An intuitive deriva-
tion of the estimator is provided in Danielsson and de Vries (1997). For dis-
cussions of alternative estimators and proper convergence behavior, see for
example Draisma et al. (2001), Peng (1999), and Beirlandt and Vandewalle
(2002). Further details on the Hill estimator can be found in Jansen and de
Vries (1991), for example, and in the monograph by Embrechts, Klüppel-
berg, and Mikosch (1997).
The optimal choice of the threshold parameter mis a point of concern in
the extreme value theory literature. Goldie and Smith (1987) suggest to se-
lect the nuisance parameter m so as to minimize the asymptotic mean-
squared error. A widely used heuristic procedure plots the tail estimator as
a function of mand selects min a region where   ˆ from equation (6) is stable.
Double bootstrap techniques based upon this idea have been developed re-
cently (see, e.g., Danielsson et al., 2001), but these are only advisable for
sample sizes that are larger than the ones we have available for this paper.
For simplicity, and in accordance with the minimization criterion of
Goldie and Smith (1987), we select m    n  with   2/3, sample size n,
where   is derived from the widely used Hill plot method.26
P(X ˜
min   q)
  
P(X ˜
max   q)
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26. Minimizing the asymptotic mean-squared error for the Hill estimator by balancing bias
and variance renders this nonlinear selection rule. For convenience, we impose the parameter
restriction   2/3. While simplifying, it can be shown to hold for a wide variety of distribu-
tion functions. Moreover, establishing stable and accurate estimates of   is notoriously diﬃ-
cult (see, e.g., Gomes, de Hann, and Peng 2002, for a recent example).  is calibrated by means
of the heuristic Hill plot method. Once a value of m∗ is selected in a horizontal range of   ˆ  
  ˆ(m), the scale factor immediately follows from   m∗/n2/3.Appendix B
Test for Time Variation in the Indicators 
of Banking System Stability: Details
In this appendix we discuss a number of more technical issues that had to
be left out from the description of the Quintos, Fan, and Phillips recursive
structural break test presented in subsection 4.4.1.
Let tdenote the endpoint of a subsample of size wt n. The recursive es-
timator for the tail-dependence parameter   is calculated from equation
(6) for subsamples [1; t] ⊂ [1; n]:
(B.1)   ˆ t   ∑
mt 1
j 0
ln   ,
with mt    t2/3.27
The value of the recursive test statistic equals the supremum of the fol-
lowing time series:
(B.2) Y 2
n(t)        1 
2
.
Expression (B.2) compares the recursive value of the estimated tail param-
eter (6) or (B.1) to its full sample counterpart   ˆ n. The null hypothesis of in-
terest is that the tail-dependence parameter does not exhibit any temporal
changes. More speciﬁcally, let  tbe the dependence in the left tail of X. The
null hypothesis of constancy then takes the form
(B.3) H0 :  (nr)    ,  r ∈ Rε   (ε; 1   ε) ⊂ (0; 1),
with [nr] representing the integer value of nr. Without prior knowledge
about the direction of a break, one is interested in testing the null against
the two-sided alternative hypothesis HA :  (nr)    . For practical reasons
this test is calculated over compact subsets of (0; 1); that is, t equals the
integer part of nr for r ∈ Rε   (ε; 1 – ε) and for small ε   0. Sets like Rεare
often used in the construction of parameter constancy tests (see, e.g., An-
drews 1993).28 In line with Quandt’s (1960) pioneering work on endoge-
nous breakpoint determination in linear time series models, the candidate
break date r can be selected as the maximum value of the test statistic (B.2)
  ˆ n  
  ˆ t
tmt  
n





176 Philipp Hartmann, Stefan Straetmans, and Casper G. de Vries
27. See the end of appendix A for a discussion of how to choose m.
28. The restricted choice of r implies that εn   t   (1 – ε)n. When the lower bound would
be violated the recursive estimates might become too unstable and ineﬃcient because of too-
small subsample sizes. On the other hand, the test will never ﬁnd a break for t equal or very
close to n, because the test value (B.2) is close to zero in that latter case. Thus, for computa-
tional eﬃciency one might stop calculating the tests beyond the upper bound of (1 – ε) n   n.
We search for breaks in the [0.15n; 0.85n] subset of the total sample, as Andrews (1993) does.because at this point in time the constancy hypothesis is most likely to be
violated.
Asymptotic critical values can be derived for the sup-value of equation
(B.2), but if the data are temporally dependent the test sequence Y 2
n needs
to be scaled in order to guarantee convergence to the same limiting distri-
bution function as in the case of absence of temporal dependence. It is well
known that ﬁnancial returns exhibit nonlinear dependencies like, for ex-
ample, ARCH eﬀects (volatility clustering). It is likely that the loading vari-
able X ˜
min, previously deﬁned as the cross-sectional minimum of the bank
stock returns (transformed using their proper empirical distribution func-
tion), partly inherits these nonlinearities. The nonlinear dependence im-
plies that the asymptotic variance of the Hill estimator 1/  ˆ is s2/ 2, with s
some scaling factor. If the scaling factor diﬀers from 1 (presence of tempo-
ral dependence), the asymptotic critical values of the test statistic will de-
pend on the scaling. Quintos, Fan, and Phillips suggest to premultiply the
test statistic with the inverse of the scaling factor in order to let it converge
to the same critical values as in the i.i.d. case. However, their scaling esti-
mator is based upon the ARCH assumption for univariate time series. As
we do not want to make very speciﬁc assumptions on the precise structure
of the nonlinear dependence in the marginals, we apply a block bootstrap
to the asymptotic variance of the Hill statistic 1/  ˆ and thus the scaling fac-
tor s.29 Following Hall, Horowitz, and Jing (1995), the optimal block
length is set equal to n1/3. One now selects r for the recursive test such that
Y 2
n(t)—appropriately scaled—is maximal:
(B.4)  r∈R    sup s ˆ  1Y 2
n(t),
with s ˆ the estimate of the scaling factor. The null of parameter constancy
is rejected if this sup-value exceeds the asymptotic critical values.
Appendix C
Small Sample Properties of Estimators and Tests
Small Sample Properties of the Bivariate Estimator
In this section we investigate the small sample properties of our estima-
tors. We limit our attention to the bivariate version, which could either be
a spillover probability between two banks or a tail- , and the respective de-
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29. The scale is estimated by s   ˆm  ˆ 2(1/  ˆ) with   ˆ 2the block bootstrapped variance of the
Hill statistic.pendence parameter. Without loss of generality, we will always refer to tail-
 in the following discussion. Three diﬀerent data-generating processes are
investigated: the bivariate Pareto distribution (C.1), the bivariate Morgen-
stern distribution (1956) with Pareto marginals (C.2), and the bivariate
standard normal distribution (C.3). The ﬁrst two distributions both have
Pareto marginals, but only the ﬁrst distribution exhibits asymptotic de-
pendence (in which case   1). The bivariate normal is also asymptoti-
cally independent (as long as ⏐ ⏐   1). The normal distribution has a de-
pendence parameter   that varies with the correlation coeﬃcient, and we
investigate diﬀerent conﬁgurations. The precise speciﬁcations of the dis-
tributions are as follows:
Bivariate Pareto
(C.1) F(x, y)   1   x     y     (x   y   1)  ,
  1/  for   2,
  1.
Bivariate Morgenstern Distribution with Pareto Marginals
(C.2) F(x, y)  (1   x  )(1   y  )(1    x  y  ),   1    1,
      (  2)(2  1) 2 for   2,
  1/2.
Bivariate Normal with Correlation Coeﬃcient   and Dependence Parameter
(C.3)   
The three speciﬁc distributions have the advantage that they allow us to
calculate the true value of   and the tail-  (  ). Thus, the estimation bias
and asymptotic mean-squared error can be calculated explicitly. The true
“benchmark” values of the tail- s are:
     (2   p1/ )   (bivariate Pareto),
     (1    )p   2 p2    p3 (bivariate Morgenstern),
     , (bivariate standard normal),
where p   P(X   x). In the following tables we evaluate the tail- s and de-
pendence parameters at p   0.05 percent, which is one of the marginal sig-
 ( x,  x,  )
  
p
1   
 
2
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sample sizes are considered: a truly small sample of 500 observations and
a larger sample of 3,106, corresponding to the actual sample size in the em-
pirical application to bank stocks.
The following three tables report true values of    as well as estimates of
the average, bias, and standard deviation of  and   for 5,000 Monte Carlo
replications. Notice that biases are reported in absolute and not in per-
centage terms. Back-of-the-envelope calculations of the relative (percent-
age) biases may nevertheless be handy for the sake of comparing the bias
across diﬀerent parametrizations, but were omitted because of space con-
siderations.30 Averages, biases, and standard deviations are multiplied by
100 for the sake of convenience. The estimates are conditioned on cutoﬀ
points m∗ that minimize the Asymptotic Mean Squared error (AMSE).
The AMSE is calculated for 5,000 Monte Carlo replications.31
We start with an evaluation for the Morgenstern distribution with
Pareto marginals (see table 4C.1).
Analytic tail-  values are small, which makes this model the least realis-
tic as a benchmark for comparison with the tail- s we found in practice.
We let both the tail index   and the parameter   vary. The table shows that
the Morgenstern bias in  and   does depend on  but not on  . This is not
surprising, given that   does not enter the analytic expression of the Mor-
genstern tail- ; that is the tail-  is independent from marginal properties
in this case.32 Biases are small for small   but become substantial in both
absolute and relative terms when  is large. Also, the estimation accuracy—
as reﬂected by the standard errors s.e.—is found to be higher for small val-
ues of  .
Next, we turn to the results for the Pareto distribution. The results are in
table 4C.2. In contrast to table 4C.1, there now appears a considerable
downward bias in absolute terms for both   and   . However, the relative
(percentage) biases can be shown to be smaller than in the Morgenstern
case. Recall that the true value of   is equal to the boundary value of 1 in
this case, so that in any empirical exercise one expects at least some down-
ward bias. Moreover, (absolute and relative) biases and standard errors de-
crease with a decrease in correlation (an increase in  ).
Last, we consider the small-sample performance for the bivariate nor-
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30. Relative or percentage measures of the bias can be calculated as 100   (E[  ˆ] –  / ) and
100   (E[  ˆ ] –   )/   for the tail dependence parameter and the tail- , respectively.
31. If two (unit Pareto) random variables are independent, we previously noted that P(X  
q, Y   q)   p2 with p   P(X   q)   P(Y   q). This exact Pareto tail allows the use of all ex-
treme observations in estimation because of the unbiasedness of the Hill statistic under the
Pareto law, that is, m∗   n – 1.
32. It can be easily shown that the analytic expressions for Morgenstern bias and asymp-
totic mean squared error (AMSE) do not depend on the marginal distributional properties
like scale and tail indices.mal distribution (see table 4C.3). For the normal distribution the estima-
tors appear to behave quite reasonably. Absolute and relative biases are
found to be smaller than in the Pareto case. Moreover, it may be diﬃcult to
distinguish the normal distribution from the Pareto distribution just on the
basis of, say, the dependence parameter estimate. To this end it would be
helpful to investigate the tail properties of the marginals as well.
Small-Sample Properties of the Endogenous Break Test
In this part of the appendix we investigate the small-sample properties
of the recursive test for a single endogenous break in  . This is done
through a simulation study in which we use the bivariate normal as the
data-generating process (see table 4C.4).
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Table 4C.1 Small sample behavior of tail betas for bivariate Morgenstern distribution
  ˆ   ˆ
 (  100)
Standard Standard
( ;  ) m* Average Bias error Average Bias error    (  100)
A. n = 500
(2; 0.0) 499 0.499 –0.001 0.013 0.052 0.002 0.021 0.050
(3; 0.0) 499 0.499 –0.001 0.013 0.052 0.002 0.021 0.050
(4; 0.0) 499 0.499 –0.001 0.013 0.052 0.002 0.021 0.050
(2; 0.5) 150 0.546 0.046 0.034 0.231 0.156 0.190 0.075
(3; 0.5) 150 0.545 0.045 0.034 0.226 0.151 0.189 0.075
(4; 0.5) 150 0.546 0.046 0.034 0.232 0.157 0.198 0.075
(2; 0.9) 134 0.570 0.070 0.036 0.424 0.329 0.338 0.095
(3; 0.9) 134 0.570 0.070 0.037 0.427 0.332 0.349 0.095
(4; 0.9) 134 0.570 0.070 0.037 0.419 0.324 0.327 0.095
B. n = 3,106
(2; 0.0) 3,105 0.500 0.000 0.005 0.050 0.000 0.008 0.050
(3; 0.0) 3,105 0.500 0.000 0.005 0.050 0.000 0.008 0.050
(4; 0.0) 3,105 0.500 0.000 0.005 0.050 0.000 0.008 0.050
(2; 0.5) 376 0.532 0.032 0.023 0.152 0.077 0.083 0.075
(3; 0.5) 376 0.532 0.032 0.023 0.151 0.076 0.083 0.075
(4; 0.5) 376 0.532 0.032 0.023 0.148 0.073 0.080 0.075
(2; 0.9) 335 0.543 0.043 0.025 0.225 0.130 0.121 0.095
(3; 0.9) 335 0.543 0.043 0.025 0.224 0.129 0.120 0.095
(4; 0.9) 335 0.543 0.043 0.025 0.225 0.130 0.120 0.095
Notes: The table reports estimated values and true (analytic) values of the tail dependence parameter  
and the tail-  (  ) for different sample sizes and different parameter conﬁgurations ( ,  ). Tail- s and
corresponding biases and accuracy are expressed in percentage terms (%). Moreover, the linkage esti-
mates are conditioned on the cutoff point m* that minimizes the asymptotic mean squared error of   ˆ.
The conditioning quantiles for the tail-  are chosen such that the corresponding marginal excess prob-
abilities are equal to 0.05 percent.Table 4C.2 Small sample behavior of tail betas for bivariate Pareto distribution
  ˆ    (  100)
Standard Standard
  m* Average Bias error Average Bias error    (  100)  
A. n = 500
2 31 0.831 –0.169 0.113 15.44 –10.12 13.15 25.56 1
3 26 0.763 –0.237 0.126 8.32 –5.79 9.49 14.11 1
4 22 0.719 –0.281 0.134 5.49 –3.04 7.40 8.53 1
Indep. 499 0.498 –0.002 0.013 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.05 1/2
B. n = 3,106
2 89 0.889 –0.111 0.073 19.19 –6.38 8.73 25.57 1
3 45 0.832 –0.168 0.106 10.61 –3.50 7.51 14.11 1
4 42 0.777 –0.223 0.110 6.28 –2.25 5.37 8.53 1
Indep. 3,105 0.500 0.000 0.005 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.05 1/2
Notes: The table reports estimated values and true (analytic) values of the tail-dependence parameter  
and the tail-  (  ) for different sample sizes and different values of  . Tail- s and corresponding biases
and accuracy are expressed in percentage terms (%). Moreover, the linkage estimates are conditioned on
the cutoff point m* that minimizes the Asymptotic Mean Squared Error of   ˆ. The conditioning quan-
tiles for the tail-  are chosen such that the corresponding marginal excess probabilities are equal to 0.05
percent.
Table 4C.3 Small sample behavior of tail betas for bivariate normal distribution\
  ˆ   ˆ
  (  100)
Standard Standard
  m* Average Bias error Average Bias error    (  100)   = 
A. n = 500
3/4 138 0.795 –0.080 0.038 13.55 –4.59 5.11 18.14 0.875
1/2 154 0.684 –0.066 0.038 3.09 –1.12 1.69 4.21 0.75
1/4 233 0.583 –0.042 0.026 0.47 –0.20 0.27 0.67 0.625
0 499 0.499 –0.001 0.013 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.05
B. n = 3,106
3/4 299 0.815 –0.060 0.031 15.74 –2.40 4.10 18.14 0.875
1/2 403 0.699 –0.051 0.027 3.47 –0.74 1.20 4.21 0.75
1/4 574 0.594 –0.031 0.020 0.54 –0.12 0.20 0.66 0.625
0 3,105 0.500 0.000 0.005 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.5
Notes: The table reports estimated values and true (analytic) values of the tail-dependence parameter  
and the tail-  (  ) for different sample sizes and different correlations  . Tail- s and corresponding
biases and accuracy are expressed in percentage terms (%). Moreover, the linkage estimates are condi-
tioned on the cutoff point m* that minimizes the Asymptotic Mean Squared Error of   ˆ. The condition-
ing quantiles for the tail- are chosen such that the corresponding marginal excess probabilities are equal
to 0.05 percent.
1 +  
2Recall that in this case   (1    )/2. By changing the correlation coeﬃ-
cient, we can easily change the dependence parameter  .
The breaks are engineered at ﬁve diﬀerent points in the sample (see r-
columns in the table). Three diﬀerent combinations of pre- and postbreak
 s are considered (see rows of the table). The sample size is 3,000. Table
4C.4 shows that the test has more diﬃculty in accurately locating the break
if it is close to the start or the end of the sample. The reason is that in these
cases one has fewer observations available for one of the two subsamples.
When the change in the dependence parameter is small, then the standard
errors tend to be more sizable. For example, the standard errors in the ﬁrst
and third scenario are about twice as large as in the second scenario. In
sum, the cases in which we have to be more cautious in interpreting the test
results are when the changes in   are small and when they occur close to
the boundaries of the sample.
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Table 4C.4 Simulated breakpoints
Estimated breakpoints (standard error)
( 1;  2) r = 1/3 r = 1/2 r = 2/3
(0.5; 0.7) 0.364 0.514 0.617
(0.190) (0.166) (0.117)
(0.5; 0.9) 0.264 0.485 0.636
(0.095) (0.078) (0.092)
(0.7; 0.9) 0.394 0.508 0.587
(0.209) (0.172) (0.194)
Notes:Estimated breakpoints are reported for the tail dependence parameter of the bivariate
normal df. The break estimates are reported for varying locations of the true breakpoints 
(r = 1/3, 1/3, 2/3). The number of Monte Carlo replications is set to 1,000. The accompanying
sampling errors are reported between brackets. Q-tests are calculated starting with a mini-
mum sample size of 500. For sake of convenience, we set the number of upper-order extremes
used in estimating the tail index equal to 2n2/3.Banking System Stability 183
Appendix D
Table 4D.1 List of banks in the sample
Euro area United States
Bank name Abbreviation Bank name Abbreviation
Citigroup CITIG
JP Morgan Chase JP MORGAN
Bank of America BOA BAMERICA
Wachovia Corporation WACHOVIA
Wells Fargo and Company FARGO
Bank One Corporation BONE
Washington Mutual, Inc. WASHING
Fleet Boston Financial Corporation FLEET





National City Corporation CITYCO






Huntington Bancshares, Inc. HUNTING
BBT Corporation BBT
Fifth Third Bancorp 53BANCO
Southtrust SOTRUST
Regions Financial Corporation REGIONS
Germany
Deutsche Bank DEUTSCHE
















Banco Santander Central Hispano SANTANDER
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria BILBAO












Allied Irish Banks IRBAN
Portugal
Banco Commercial Portugues BCPAppendix E
Volatility Modeling and the Analysis 
of Banking System Stability
A widely recognized feature of ﬁnancial market returns is volatility clus-
tering (see, e.g., Bollerslev, Chou, and Kroner, 1992). So a question that
comes to mind is to which extent the extreme dependence between bank
stock returns and its changes we discover in this paper is associated with
persistence and changes in volatility. Before providing some answers to this
question, we need to establish ﬁrst the relationship between the manner in
which volatility of bank stock returns is modeled and the objectives of our
paper. So, in the ﬁrst section of this appendix we discuss whether ﬁnancial
stability policy oriented research should focus on conditional volatility
modeling or not. In the second section we summarize some results for our
indicators of banking system stability when the return data are cleaned for
GARCH eﬀects.
How Useful Is Conditional Volatility Modeling for Financial
Stability Policy?
The main objective of our work is to measure systemic risk in banking
on the basis of market data. The amount of systemic risk in banking is in-
strumental for the assessment of ﬁnancial stability and for the design of
policies to preserve the stability of ﬁnancial systems, such as banking reg-
ulation and crisis management. The indicators of banking system stability
we are using are designed to satisfy the demand by policymakers, who need
to have a view about the likelihood of crises and who need to devise the best
ﬁnancial regulations to preserve ﬁnancial stability.
To assess system stability, banking supervisors need to know the likeli-
hood that one or several banks break down given that other banks break
down, or how likely it is that one or several banks break down given that
there is an adverse macroeconomic shock. They are not interested in two-
sided volatility of bank stock returns per se or in its persistence. In addi-
tion, banking regulations are determined in advance for longer periods of
time. They cannot be changed within a few days. So, they need to be based
on long-term structural risk assessments, not on the likelihood of volatility
tomorrow given today’s volatility. This is why, for the questions we are in-
terested in, straight returns are preferable to volatility of returns and un-
conditional modeling is preferable to conditional models. In contrast, con-
ditional models will be preferable for short-term volatility forecasting, as
today’s volatility is informative for tomorrow’s volatility. This type of anal-
ysis may be more important for short-term pricing of ﬁnancial instru-
ments.
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Although the indicators (1) and (2) are the right ones for answering the
questions of interest in this paper, we may learn from unclustered return
data more about the statistical components of spillover and extreme sys-
tematic risk in banking. For example, Poon, Rockinger, and Tawn (2004)
argue that conditional heteroskedasticity is an important source of ex-
treme dependence in stock markets in general, but not the only one. Thus,
in this section we ask to which extent the extreme dependence of bank
stock returns uncovered in the main body of the paper results from uni-
variate volatility clustering or multivariate dependence in volatilities. We
do this by ﬁltering our bank excess returns with standard GARCH(1,1)
processes and by recalculating the results for our estimators of banking
system risk and related tests.
Appendix E.1 in the accompanying working paper (Hartmann, Straet-
mans, and C. de Vries 2005) reports the results for multivariate spillover
probabilities (equation [1]) using the unclustered return data. Tables E.1
through E.5 there reproduce tables 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.9, and 4.10 in the main text
here for GARCH-ﬁltered returns. While extreme dependence generally tends
to decrease, the qualitative results are quite similar to the ones for plain bank
returns. Only very few of the spillover risk changes in Europe (table 4.9) seem
to be entirely related to volatility clustering. But clustering plays more of a role
in the diﬀerences between domestic and cross-border spillovers (table 4.4).
Multivariate spillover risk in the United States and Europe, as well as its
changes over time, seem little related to volatility clustering (tables 4.5 and
4.10). This is also conﬁrmed by the dotted lines in ﬁgures 4.1 and 4.2, which
describe the same statistics as the solid lines for GARCH-ﬁltered returns.
Appendix E.2 in the working paper does the same for tail- s (equation
[2]). Tables E.6 through E.10 there reproduce tables 4.6, 4.7, 4.8, 4.11, and
4.12 in the main text here for unclustered returns. As for the previously
noted spillover risk, dependencies generally decrease, but none of the qual-
itative results is fundamentally changed. Again this is also conﬁrmed by
the dotted lines in ﬁgure 4.3, which illustrate the more muted changes in
GARCH-ﬁltered tail- s and the same direction of their movements.
Overall, we can conclude that in line with the results of Poon, Rockinger,
and Tawn (2004) for stock markets in general, part of the extreme depend-
encies in bank stock returns we ﬁnd in this paper are related to time-varying
volatility and volatility clustering. From the exercises summarized in this
appendix we can not ascertain whether this phenomenon is related to the
marginal distributions or to multivariate dependence of volatilities. Never-
theless, the primary results that supervisors should pay attention to in order
to assess general banking system stability and decide upon regulatory poli-
cies are the unadjusted spillover and systematic risk probabilities.
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Comment Anthony Saunders
Introduction
The topic of banking contagion and crash risk has spawned a volumi-
nous literature, exceeding more than 100 papers. Yet despite apparent
extreme events, such as September 11th, 2001, the banking systems of Eu-
rope and the United States seem robust, and have survived such events in
a remarkably intact way. One possible explanation is that central bankers
have been highly skilled in using policy instruments—such as the discount
window during the September 11th event—to deter contagious runs and
crashes. Nevertheless, the possibility remains that there will be an event
that overwhelms even the most sophisticated and adaptable policymakers.
Thus, the question of what is the probability of a crash occurring in the cur-
rent United States and euro area banking contexts is of some importance.
188 Philipp Hartmann, Stefan Straetmans, and Casper G. de VriesThis essentially is the focus of this excellent and comprehensive paper by
Hartmann, Straetmans, and de Vries.
The Authors’ Approach
To date, a large number of approaches have been employed to examine
bank contagion risk. These include: (1) event study analysis on stock re-
turns, (2) correlation analysis, (3) fund withdrawal behavior, and (4) logit/
probit analysis. This literature is amply reviewed in an earlier paper by De-
Bant and Hartmann and I will not go over the strengths and weaknesses of
these approaches again here. What has been missing is a detailed examina-
tion of the tails of bank failure probability distributions. Put simply, what
is the probability that an extreme event (e.g., far worse than September
11th) will have such a strong systematic impact that we will get the long-
feared crash of Western banking systems?
The authors’ novel approach is to use extreme value theory (EVT)—long
used in life insurance to assess extreme claims risk—to examine the prob-
ability of extreme banking events, such as a systemic collapse. To para-
phrase the authors, they apply EVT to examine dependencies in the ex-
treme tail of bank equity return distributions within countries and between
countries with emphasis on the United States and Europe. This extreme
risk is measured in two ways: (1) between bank stock returns and (2) be-
tween a bank’s stock return and bank indexes, so as to examine the home
country’s systematic exposure to shocks (so-called tail-  [beta] risk). Since
the focus is on large bank contagion, the banks analyzed are twenty-ﬁve
United States and twenty-ﬁve European banks, chosen based on two crite-
ria: (1) size and (2) interbank lending market presence. The basic prem-
ise—although not one tested directly in the paper—is that a primary route
of contagion among banks is through the interbank market in purchased
funds. Thus, the branch structures and deposit-raising powers of diﬀerent
banks are not explicitly explored in the paper. For example, a bank with the
same interbank borrowing exposure as another bank, but with a more ex-
tensive branch network (and thus core deposit base) would likely be less
susceptible to interbank market propagation of shocks. Of course, one
could think of many more sample conditioning variables (see later), but to
my mind the authors’ focus on size and interbank lending seems a reason-
able ﬁrst approximation.
The Authors’ Major Findings
The paper has a large number of empirical results and ﬁndings. I will
leave technical issues such as their choice of tail indicator measure and es-
timation approaches to others to evaluate, but the choice of an appropriate
estimator is not without controversy, especially in regards to parametric
versus nonparametric methods of estimation (the authors apply a semi-
Banking System Stability 189parametric method of estimation). Contingent on their choice of estima-
tor, the authors most important ﬁndings are that the risk of a bank conta-
gion spillover in the euro area is lower than in the United States. In addi-
tion, they ﬁnd that banks in smaller countries on the periphery of the euro
area, such as Finland and Greece, have lower cross-country contagion risk
than those in larger, “central” euro area countries (possibly due to weaker
cross-country linkages in small countries). Finally, they ﬁnd that a struc-
tural increase in bank contagion risk has taken place in both the U.S. and
European banking markets.
Remaining Issues
No paper can address all the issues relating to large bank contagion, al-
though this paper comes very close to doing this. What remains to be done?
EVT and Capital Requirements
The focus of the paper is on the correlation between banks’ extreme
(negative) tail risks and the probability of joint crashes. The reader—or at
least one interested in bank regulation—thinks about the adequacy of
bank capital requirements such as those under Basel I and Basel II. There
is little or no discussion of the probability of current or proposed bank cap-
ital requirements withstanding the size of the EVT-based co-crash proba-
bilities found in the paper. For example, perhaps there is a structural in-
crease in contagion risk—but what is the probability of joint failure under
a Basel I 8 percent rule? Importantly, it should be noted that the issue of
the optimum size of a systematic component to bank capital relative to the
size of the bank-speciﬁc (unsystematic) component remains a relatively
underresearched area. Since there seems to be a clear potential linkage be-
tween co-crash banks’ EVT-measured risk and the optimal size of bank
systematic risk capital, this issue could have been explored by the authors.
Interbank Loans
I’m still not convinced that interbank lending exposure as measured in
the Hartman, Straetmans, and de Vries paper is really the best way (along
with size) to select the samples of euro area and U.S. banks. For example,
I still have a hard time convincing myself that State Street Bank or North-
ern Trust belong in the same contagion risk league as Citicorp. Their in-
clusion appears to be, in part, dependent on their prominent clearing and
settlement activities. However, much of this activity is in securities markets
and not the fed funds market or on the clearing house interbank payments
system (CHIPS), which are most relevant for interbank lending in the
United States. This suggests that additional sample conditioning variables
may be worth exploring, such as branch networks, or the scope of geo-
graphic diversiﬁcation of funds, both of which would provide some form 
of risk mitigation in the presence of a run in the interbank market.
190 Philipp Hartmann, Stefan Straetmans, and Casper G. de VriesMergers and Acquisitions
While the authors take note of the growth in merger and acquisition
(M&A) activity in enhancing interbank correlations, my feeling is that its
current and future importance is somewhat underplayed in the paper. For
example, the high rate of bank M&As in the United States following the
passage of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking Act in 1994 may well explain
a signiﬁcant component of the higher relative contagion risk in the United
States versus the euro area in the later 1990s. This is especially so in view 
of the relatively slow cross-border bank M&A in the euro area to date
(notwithstanding the Single Capital Market legislation). In addition, the
existence of M&A activity raises some important implications in terms of
sample selection bias, including (1) the use of bank asset size and (2) sur-
vivorship bias over a twelve-year sample period. My feeling is that these is-
sues are not suﬃciently confronted in the paper.
Other Conditioning Variables
The authors focus on conditioning systematic risk on either general
bank indexes or high-yield spreads. Thus, unsystematic bank risk is the
residual excess return after such conditioning. This unsystematic risk will
include all other risk eﬀects after controlling for market indexes or yield
spreads. As is well known, one- or two-factor models potentially leave a lot
of systematic risk unexplained. Indeed, when I think of extreme events, my
natural inclination is to think of disasters or catastrophes (including repu-
tational), which are often put under the general rubric of “operational”
risk. Indeed, one interesting EVT question is that after controlling for all
reasonable systematic risk factors—including market and macro-factors—
what are the co-crash probabilities across banks’ operational or “extreme
event” risks? While the authors have not extended their research in this
direction, there is one recent working paper by Allen and Bali of Baruch
College, CUNY that explores this issue by analyzing correlations across
residual stock returns after controlling for a large array of market and
macro-factors. In sum, one is not quite sure what remaining tail risks the
Hartmann, Straetmans, and de Vries paper explores.
Good News Contagion
The focus of this paper, as in much of the bank contagion literature, is on
contagion due to bad news or negative events. This is, of course, natural,
given the “specialness” of banks and the downside macro-risk and exter-
nalities from systemic failure. Nevertheless, there is often good news, such
as an individual bank announcing record earnings that may well (also)
favorably impact other banks’ stock return distributions. For example, is
bank-speciﬁc good news suﬃciently contagious across banks that it en-
hances the safety and soundness of the banking system overall? For ex-
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associated with such news by issuing more equity to bolster capital reserves
against bad times. To my knowledge upside contagion or extreme positive
event risk is a relatively unexplored area.
Conclusion
This is an excellent paper. The authors should be commended for pro-
posing and employing a novel way of thinking about event and co-crash
risk across banks. As noted earlier, the results of the paper have important
implications for policymakers, encompassing M&A, cross-border policy,
capital requirements, and safety net design in general. I’m sure that there
will be many future papers extending the Hartmann, Straetmans, and de
Vries EVT methodology, including ones analyzing developing banking
systems such as those in Asia, Africa, and elsewhere.
Discussion Summary
René Stulz opened the general discussion by asking whether what the au-
thors measure as contagion simply reﬂects an increase in volatility of a fac-
tor that aﬀects the equity returns of all banks. Philipp Hartmannnoted that
results of some preliminary robustness checks employing GARCH models
imply that this is not the whole story, but even if it is, the vulnerability of
the banking system to extreme shocks is of interest. This issue is now dis-
cussed in detail in the revised version of the paper. Jan Krahnenasked about
the experience of healthy versus unhealthy banks, and Hartmann replied
that extreme moves appear to be larger for the latter.
Eric Rosengrensuggested segmenting the sample by market-makers ver-
sus other banks, rather than using geography, as the relative vulnerability
of the major dealer banks is of considerable interest. Hashem Pesaran sug-
gested systematic pairwise comparison of banks in the sample, to see if
most of the average results are coming from a few banks. Philipp Hartmann
noted that a pairwise approach would not capture higher-order dependen-
cies, which are captured by the authors’ method.
In response to a query about practitioner use of extreme value theory,
Ken Abbott noted that although the methods used by risk managers gener-
ally have to be understandable by nonspecialists, and EVT does not yet
meet that standard, he intends to train his staﬀ to understand EVT.
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